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ARTICLES
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AS A
COMPARATIVE RIGHT
JOHN E. FEE*

The role of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment in requiring
compensation for government actions that treat landowners unequally is
seldom explored. This is remarkable given that the Supreme Court has said
for more than a century that the Takings Clause
prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just
share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to
the public something more and different from that which is exacted from
other members
of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned
1
to him.
One might infer from this description of the Fifth Amendment that the
regulatory takings doctrine should have developed as a comparative right (a
species of equal protection law)-a right to be treated legally the same as
other property owners in a community, or to receive compensation when
differential treatment is justified. Indeed, when the Supreme Court first
held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the rule that government
may not take private property without just compensation, it relied on the
2
Equal Protection Clause, not the Due Process Clause.
*
Assistant Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. I am grateful to
workshop participants at BYU Law School and the University of Cincinnati Law School for helpful
comments. I also thank Joshua Ellis, Todd Wahlquist, Doug Larson, Mike Black, Michele Harker, and

Jared Martin for valuable research assistance.
1.
2.

Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (emphasis added).
In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399, 410 (1894), the Court held that

the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from taking private property without just compensation and
invalidated a state regulatory scheme on that basis. Three years after Reagan, in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 266, 233-41 (1897), the Supreme Court relied on the Due
Process Clause in holding that states may not take private property without just compensation, without
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The comparative-right basis for the takings doctrine, however, is
largely ignored in modern regulatory takings law. Our regulatory takings
doctrine today functions more like a substantive due process right. Similar
to due process cases prohibiting excessive punitive damages awards,3 the
law of regulatory takings is commonly understood as a defense for
individuals against government actions that are extreme and unreasonable
as applied to the individual, rather than as a guarantee of equal treatment
among members of a community. Whether regulation of one owner's
property has gone "too far" for regulatory takings purposes is determined
independently of how the government regulates other owners.4
Thus, if a landowner challenges a land use regulation as a taking, a
court generally asks whether the regulation imposes an unreasonable
burden on the landowner alone. It considers factors such as whether the
regulation has frustrated the owner's reasonable "investment-backed
expectations," the extent to which the owner has other viable uses for the
land, and whether the restriction furthers important governmental interests. 5
The court generally will not ask how many other landowners are subject to
the same regulation. This tendency to ignore the comparative scope of a
regulation may exist because society considers private property to be an
inherently individual right. It may also be that a comparative regulatory
takings doctrine seems unworkable. In any case, whether the government
has gone too far in regulating private property is something that is
determined for each landowner separately, based on individual
6
circumstances.
so much as citing Reagan. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. is often cited today as the
foundational case holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Takings Clause against the
states, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 & n.5 (1994), while Reagan and its earlier
equal protection holding have been largely forgotten.
3. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (holding that "grossly
excessive" punitive awards amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law).
4. While the Supreme Court has made a point to distinguish its regulatory takings cases from
any substantive due process rationale, see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 n.5, some scholars have questioned
whether this distinction is meaningful. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent:
Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV.
713, 750-51 (2002); J. Freitag, Note, Takings 1992: Scalia's Jurisprudence and a Fifth Amendment
Doctrine to Avoid Lochner Redivivus, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 743, 774-76 (1994) (likening the regulatory
takings doctrine to Lochner-era economic or substantive due process).
5. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
6. In rare cases in which owners raise equality arguments to support takings claims, such
arguments are typically dismissed. See, e.g., Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1579 (10th
Cir. 1995) ("[T]he Takings Clause allows some property owners to be more burdened by a challenged
governmental regulation than others .... "); San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 10809 (Cal. 2002) ("[T]he necessary reciprocity of advantage lies not in ... an exact equality of burdens
among all property owners...."); Moskow v. Comm'r of Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 427 N.E.2d 750, 753
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The modern view that the Takings Clause protects isolated property
interests is implicit in both of the dominant tests for identifying regulatory
takings. This notion underlies the rule announced in Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council: A land use restriction is a taking if it deprives an
owner of "all economically beneficial uses" of the owner's land.7 In
Lucas, the Court explicitly declined to consider how many other
8
landowners in the community were subject to the restriction in question,
holding that it does not matter whether an owner is singled out relative to
his or her neighbors or subject to the same general rules as other
landowners. 9 According to the Court, a land use regulation that deprives an
owner of all economically viable use "no more acquires immunity by
plundering landowners generally than does a law specifically directed at
religious practice acquire immunity by prohibiting all religions."'
The
Court rejected the dissent's alternative of examining comparative effects,
claiming that such an approach would "render[] the Takings Clause little
more than a particularized restatement of the Equal Protection Clause.""
That the Takings Clause protects, at most, an owner's ' personal
economic position vis-A-vis the government is also implicit in the balancing
test of Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City.'" According to
Penn Central, a land use regulation is a taking if, under all the
circumstances of the case, it causes an owner to bear a burden that "in all
fairness and justice[] should be borne by the public as a whole."13 In
practice, courts treat the "fairness and justice" inquiry as a form of
means-end scrutiny.14 In Penn Central, the Court dismissed an argument
(Mass. 1981) ("Legislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than
others.") (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 133).
7. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
8. See id. at 1027 n.14.
9. In Lucas, the owner was in fact regulated differently than even his immediate neighbors, who
were allowed to maintain existing houses on their parcels. See id. at 1008. The rule announced by the
Supreme Court does not focus on the comparative effects, but rather turns on whether the regulation
deprived the owner of all economically beneficial uses of land not inconsistent with existing state law.
See id. at 1019, 1030-31. The Court identified the status of neighbors and neighboring parcels as
important only to the extent that they revealed the existing law. See id. at 1030-31.
10. Id. at 1027 n.14.
I1. Id.
12. 438 U.S. 104,123-24 (1978).
13. Id. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
14. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) ("Although no precise rule
determines when property has been taken, the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and
public interests.") (internal citation omitted). In Agins, the Court went so far as to cite substantive due
process cases in its regulatory takings analysis and held that "[t]he application of a general zoning law
to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Id. at 260 (internal citations omitted).
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that the plaintiff was regulated differently from neighboring owners with
the observation that "[l]egislation designed to promote the general welfare
commonly burdens some more than others."' 5 More important to the Court
than whether the regulation disadvantaged one class of owners for the
benefit of a broader class were the following: The restriction was
"substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare" and the
owner could still make some reasonable beneficial use of its land. 16
Although it may seem natural to treat takings law as a balance
between an individual owner's interests and the government's regulatory
objectives, this approach to the law has produced a jurisprudential mess. If
there is a consensus today about regulatory takings law, it is that it is highly
muddled. 17
Our takings doctrine is both lacking in theory and
unpredictable in application. Among its numerous mysteries are the
denominator problem, which seems to indicate that the more property a
person owns, the less likely he or she is to be compensated for an
equivalent regulatory loss;'8 the public interest problem, which indicates
that the more the government has to gain from a change in regulation, the
less likely it will have to pay for the change; 19 and the unexplained
relationship between regulatory takings and taxes. 20 When the Supreme
Court has occasion to address these and other mysteries in takings law, it
typically dodges the issue and resorts to ad hocery. The standard wisdom
and response given by the Court to every difficult issue is that no set rule or
formula can explain whether a regulation requires compensation. 2' As
15. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978).
16. Id. at 138 (summarizing the Court's holding on these grounds).
17. For a few of many criticisms, see J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 102 (1995) (describing the regulatory takings
doctrine as "an unworkable muddle"); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed
Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 92 (1995)
("Regulatory takings are proving to be one of the enduring legal dilemmas of the twentieth century.");
Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I-A Critique of
Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (1989) ("l]t is difficult to imagine a

body of case law in greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray."); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed:
Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562 (1984) ("ICiommentators propose

test after test to define 'takings,' while courts continue to reach ad hoc determinations rather than
principled resolutions."). Even some judges have joined in criticizing the confused state of the law.
See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 10 Cal. 4th 368, 394 (1995) (Kennard, J., concurring)
("[L]egal commentators have long described takings law 'as a field of doctrinal incoherence littered
with differing and inconsistent rationales."').
18.
19.

See infra pp. 1028-32.
See infra pp. 1035-36.

20. See infra pp. 1037-38.
21.
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) ("Since Mahon, we have
given some, but not too specific, guidance to courts confronted with deciding whether a particular
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Justice John Paul Stevens has remarked, "[e]ven the wisest lawyers would
have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this Court's
' 22
takings jurisprudence."
This Article is an optimistic attempt to resolve some of these problems
in takings law, or at least to suggest a direction that may lead toward their
resolution. It aims to do so in a way that would not radically change the
outcomes of takings cases, but that would reorient the theory underlying
takings decisions. Only by rethinking the right of private property as a
comparative right may we begin to clear the debris of the regulatory
takings doctrine.
There is no principled way under a wholly
noncomparative theory of the Fifth Amendment to distinguish between
regulations that should be deemed takings of private property and those that
should not. The reason for this is that the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause, like the Equal Protection Clause, is designed to protect the legal
rights of individual citizens relative to others, not to protect individual
expectations of wealth or to provide an insurance policy against
unreasonable governmental burdens. The right of just compensation
accorded to every property owner by the Takings Clause is fundamentally
an antidiscrimination principle. This explains, for example, why general
taxes have never been understood to violate the Takings Clause, although
taxes do diminish a person's private wealth for public use. It also explains
why general criminal laws, liability rules, or business regulations should
not be considered takings, no matter how financially burdensome they may
be to some owners. The default "bundle of rights" inherent in private
property includes an affirmative "right to use" one's private assets, which
may not be denied without compensation. This right to use, however, is
inherently bounded by the government's power to restrict an owner's
conduct through general laws. The proper role of the Takings Clause is to
require compensation in those circumstances where the government
legitimately targets merely one or a few owners to bear a unique legal
burden for the benefit of the general community.
To understand the Takings Clause as a comparative right is not to
claim that the current legal balance between government interests and
government action goes too far and effects a regulatory taking."); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) ("[W]e have generally eschewed any 'set formula' for determining how far is
too far, preferring to 'engag[e] in ... essentially ad hoc factual inquiries."') (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124). The Court's continued ad hoc approach to regulatory takings has
remained a constant source for academic criticism. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 4, at 738
(describing the Court's ad hoc approach as "profoundly embarrassing"); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Against Ad Hoce y: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1988).

22.

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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private interests is far off the mark. The purpose of this Article is not to
propose a dramatic shift in legal outcomes; rather, it is to suggest a way to
more accurately identify the basis for existing law and to propose a
framework that will allow the law to develop in a principled way.
Although current takings tests are not based explicitly on a comparative
theory of the Fifth Amendment, much of current law is well supported by
such a theory.
In fact, understanding the Takings Clause as an
antidiscrimination rule may be the only way to explain and unify such
disjointed takings standards as the Lucas rule concerning land use
restrictions, the Loretto rule concerning physical occupations of land,2 3 and
the Dolan rule concerning development exactions.24 At some level, it
seems that intuitions of comparative justice have been shaping takings law
all along.
Part I of this Article describes the regulatory takings puzzle as a
conflict between classical property theory and intuitive outcomes. We as a
society are committed to the belief that property consists of a bundle of
rights, and yet our judicial decisions indicate that only some regulations of
property require compensation. Part II discusses ways of resolving this
conflict, assuming that property consists of only individualized rights, and
it concludes that any such effort is problematic. As long as takings law
ignores the comparative dimension of private property, it will continue to
be a muddle. Part III establishes the interpretive basis for a comparative
regulatory takings doctrine. Contrary to first impression, a comparative
takings doctrine is well supported both textually and historically. It
matches both the classical conception of property and the underlying
purpose of the Takings Clause. Part IV discusses practical implications,
problems, and solutions. This Part demonstrates through various examples
that a comparative takings doctrine is workable in practice and need not
produce extreme results, as long as we adopt a proper measure of equality.
A well-defined comparative takings theory supports many of the takings
standards that exist, and provides a useful framework for resolving future
disputes.
23. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding that
permanent physical occupations are per se takings of private property).
24. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1994) (holding that when the
government requires an owner to surrender a property interest in exchange for a regulatory approval,
the exaction must be roughly proportional to the adverse effects of the approved land use).
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I. THE REGULATORY TAKINGS PUZZLE
Before building a comparative theory of the Takings Clause, let us
explore the fundamental challenge presented by regulatory takings law.
This Part addresses the puzzle of how to justify a regulatory takings
doctrine under the text of the Fifth Amendment without adopting extreme
constitutional rules that are widely viewed as unacceptable. Is it possible to
have a regulatory takings doctrine that is textually sound, theoretically
consistent, and sensible in application?
The text of the Takings Clause is straightforward: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation. "25 For most of
the first century of the Bill of Rights' existence, there was surprisingly little
debate about the meaning of this provision of the Fifth Amendment or of
similar provisions in state constitutions. In early America, there seemed to
be no ambiguity as to what was meant by private property, and what it
meant for the government to take it. At a minimum, the law was
understood to require the government to pay compensation whenever it
legally divested owners of title to land or ousted the owner of exclusive
possession. 26 The law of just compensation, it was said, arose from
principles of "natural equity," 27 but its consequences were simple and
practical: If the government acquires an owner's title to property through
the exercise of eminent domain, it must pay for the property taken. 28
With the rise of modern government, however, the outer boundaries of
the takings principle have been tested in ways that could not have been
contemplated by the founding generation. Two landmark decisions mark
the origins of the regulatory takings doctrine. In 1871, the Supreme Court
held in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. that a statute authorizing construction of
a private hydraulic dam constituted a taking of another's property whose
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014; Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081-83 (1993).
Rubenfeld persuasively explains that the only historically settled understanding of the just
compensation principle is that the government must compensate owners when it assumes full title to
property through eminent domain. Id. at 1081.
27. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1784, at
661 (1833).
28. See Rubenfeld, supra note 26, at 1081-83. Rubenfeld notes, however, that outside of formal
eminent domain proceedings, even physical invasions of private property were at times tolerated
without compensation. Id. at 1082-83. See also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 n.15 (noting that state
practices prior to incorporation of the Takings Clause "occasionally included outright physical
appropriationof land without compensation" and "were out of accord with any plausible interpretation
of those provisions").
25.
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upstream land was indirectly flooded. 29 Even though the government did
not purport to change the plaintiff's title or seize his land for public use, the
authorization so interfered with the owner's use and enjoyment of land that
the Court held it was equivalent to a deprivation of private property. 30 In
1922, the Supreme Court went further, holding in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon that a statutory restriction on certain mining practices constituted a
taking of private mineral estates. 3' According to Mahon, the government
may be required to compensate owners for merely restricting previously
lawful land use practices if the regulation in question goes too far. 32 Since
Pumpelly and Mahon, the regulatory takings doctrine has remained a
viable, but controversial, principle of constitutional law.
The controversy is not so much over whether to recognize some
regulations of property as governmental takings. If the law did not
recognize regulatory takings in some sense, the Takings Clause would
serve little purpose. Government could always avoid the compensation
requirement by merely directing the use of private property for public ends
instead of formally acquiring title to it through condemnation. As the
Court noted in Pumpelly,
[I]t would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result[] if... it shall be
held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real
property to the uses of the public it can... in effect, subject it to total
destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest
33
sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.
Accordingly, it is generally accepted that a legislative act may amount
to a taking of private property if it crosses some substantive threshold. The
difficulty is to identify that substantive boundary. What sort of regulation
amounts to a taking of private property for public use? The answer
depends as much on the meaning of private property as used in the Fifth
Amendment as it does on the phrase "taken for public use." 34 The takings
problem is essentially a boundary problem. If a city council zones a
privately owned lot for use as a city park; if it mandates that a private house
29.

See 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 166, 177-81 (1871).

30.
31.
32.

See id. at 177-78.
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922).
Id. at 415.

33.
Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177-78.
34. At least since Pumpelly, the Court has recognized that the phrase "taken for public use"
encompasses government actions that effectively destroy private property, even if the government does
not directly use the land or asset in question. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
378 (1945). For a contrary theory of the Fifth Amendment that focuses on the question of whether the
government "uses" the private property, see Rubenfeld, supra note 26.
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be used as a museum; if it requires a farmer to build and operate a
telecommunications tower on his or her land-then compensation is
constitutionally required, even if the government does not directly take title
to the private property.
To identify that constitutional boundary between private property and
the government's legitimate exercise of legislative power has proven to be
one of the great problems of modern law. Why has the puzzle proven so
difficult?
A. Two PREMISES
Much of the difficulty in regulatory takings law arises from trying to
reconcile the tension between two familiar ideas. One idea is theoretical;
the other is practical and outcome-focused. Both ideas, however, are well
entrenched in the law. Indeed, the law is so committed to both ideas that
one may treat them as premises in the regulatory takings debate. The first
premise is that private property consists of a bundle of legal rights; it does
not refer to tangible things themselves, but instead, to abstract rights a
person has in relation to things. The second premise is that the regulatory
takings doctrine achieves a balance between two unacceptable extremes:
governmental power to regulate private property without compensating
adversely affected owners on the one hand, and a regulation that goes so far
as to amount to a taking on the other. Neither the government's power to
regulate nor the owner's power to use private assets is absolute.
It is unlikely that the law will abandon either premise. Yet the ideas
are fundamentally in tension. A plausible theory of regulatory takings must
find a way to reconcile them.
1. Private Property Consists of Intangible Rights
In legal discourse, it is well accepted that private property refers to the
legal relationship between a person and others with respect to some thing
he or she is said to own. Property does not refer to a tangible thing
directly, but to a person's bundle of rights concerning that thing. 35 Those
rights may include the right to exclude others, the right to use and possess
without interference by others, and the right to transfer ownership to
35. See PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 2 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978)
[hereinafter PROPERTY] ("In current common usage, property is things, in law.., property is not things
but rights, rights in or to things.").
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others.36 The bundle-of-rights picture of property is so well accepted that it
is taught as a fundamental concept in law schools 37 and has been
incorporated into the Restatement of Property. 38 As one writer has put it,
"treating property as a bundle of rights.., has become the standard starting
39
point for an inquiry into the nature of property."
Treating property as a bundle of rights is not a uniquely modern legal
idea, as some writers have supposed.4 ° Historical usage of the term
"property" is consistent with the bundle-of-rights concept. John Lewis
wrote in his popular 1888 treatise on eminent domain, "[t]he dullest
individual among the people knows and understands that his property in
anything is a bundle of rights."'" The writings of John Locke,4 2 William
Blackstone,43 and James Madison4 4 further indicate that property was
understood in prior eras as referring to abstract rights of ownership, rather
36. Of course, the rights inherent in private property are not logically limited to these three.
Courts and scholars, however, have tended to focus primarily on the rights of use, exclusion, and
alienation in analyzing property rights. See, e.g., Maureen Straub Kordesh, "I Will Build My House
with Sticks": The Splintering of Property Interests under the Fifth Amendment May Be Hazardous to
Private Property, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 397, 451 (1996).
37. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 211 (5th ed. 2002) ("[Mlodern
analysis insists that an estate is a 'bundle of rights."').
38. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 1-10, at 3-4 & introductory note (1936).
39. J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711. 712 n. I
(1996).
40. See Leif Wenar, The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1923,
1925-28 (1997) (arguing that the historical understanding of the Takings Clause was based on an
"ordinary conception of property as things," and that the more modern bundle-of-rights conception did
not emerge until the twentieth century).
41.

JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 55, at

43(1888).
42. Locke often used the term "property" to refer to all of a person's rights, including those of
life and liberty. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 227-28 (1992).
43. Blackstone used the term "property" to refer to "those rights which a man may acquire in and
to such external things as are unconnected with his person." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 1,at 706 (William Carey Jones ed., 1916). Blackstone consistently used
the term "property" to refer to the legal rights of ownership, in contrast to his use of the term
"hereditament," which refers to those things that a person may own or possess, and are the objects of
property. See, e.g., id. §§ 15-20, at 726-33.
44. In his famous essay on property, Madison explains that property, in one sense, refers to a
person's "dominion" over the external things of the world, as Blackstone had described; but in its
"larger and juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a
right," even such rights as freedom of speech and religion. 14 JAMES MADISON, Property, in THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). Thus, according to
Madison, "as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in
his rights." Id.
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than (or, at least, in addition to) the tangible things that are the subject of
45
ownership.
To be sure, the legal conception of property has evolved. Blackstone
described property as consisting of dominion "'over the external things of
in this sense his view of property may be described as
the world"' ' and
"physicalist. 46 Modern scholars, by contrast, are more apt to describe
property as a system of social relations. 47 Blackstone's thing-oriented
conception of property, however, should not be confused with what is
sometimes described as the layperson's view, which is that property
consists of the actual things that one may own and possess (as in the
phrase, "Kindly get yourself off my property!"). 48 Blackstone and his
contemporaries understood well that property is a legal abstraction (in a
manner consistent with modern legal thought)-a person who is vested
though the person
with property is vested with certain legal interests, even
49
moment.
the
at
"thing"
any
of
may not have possession
The regulatory takings doctrine follows directly from the conceptual
understanding of property as a bundle of rights. With this view of property,
one need not stretch the text of the Fifth Amendment to comprehend
regulatory changes as takings of legal rights. Well before the modern term
"regulatory takings" came into use, Lewis described the theory in his
nineteenth century Treatise on Eminent Domain:
45. Forrest McDonald describes the rich conception of property in early America in a manner
consistent with the bundle-of-rights metaphor. See FORREST McDONALD, NovuS ORDO SECLORUM:
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1985) ("[Nleither liberty nor property was a

right, singular; each was a complex and subtle combination of many rights, powers, and duties,
distributed among individuals, society, and the state. Together, these constituted the historical 'rights of
Englishmen' of which eighteenth-century Americans were so proud .... ").
46. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1189
& n.132 (1999).
47. As Carol Rose has explained: "[Piroperty entails the cooperation of others. You cannot have
property all alone." Carol M. Rose, Property As the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329,
363 (1996). Wesley Hohfeld was particularly influential in bringing about the social conception of
property as he demonstrated that even in rem property interests consist of rights against other persons,
not things. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 74-85 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923). His work
was followed by A.M. Honord's influential analysis of the multifaceted incidents of ownership. See
A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 112-47 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).
48.
See PROPERTY, supra note 35, at 2 ("In current common usage, property is things, in law...
property is not things but rights, rights in or to things."); Bruce Ackerman, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1977) (distinguishing between the layperson's physical understanding of property
and the "Scientific Policymaker's" abstract understanding of property).
49. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 69-71 (1997); Heller, supra note 46, at 1191
& n.149.
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If property, then, consists, not in tangible things themselves, but in
certain rights in and appurtenant to those things, it follows that, when a
person is deprived of any of those rights, he is to that extent deprived of
his property, and, hence, that his property may be taken, in the
constitutional sense, though his title and possession remain
undisturbed ....
50

The Supreme Court has followed this logic in its takings
jurisprudence. In the 1945 decision, United States v. General Motors
Corp., the Court expressly adopted Lewis' definition of private property for
purposes of the Takings Clause, rejecting the more narrow "vulgar"
understanding of property as a thing that is possessed.5' In more recent
takings decisions, the Court has continued to describe property as a bundle
of rights to explain how a regulation may take private property. 52 No
justice has suggested that the bundle-of-rights conception should be
reconsidered.
2. Government May Generally Regulate Private Property Without
Compensation, but a Regulation That Goes Too Far Will Be Deemed a
Taking
The second premise of regulatory takings law has to do with the range
of outcomes this doctrine will produce. Regulatory takings law is as
committed to staying within certain outcome parameters as it is to the
theory that produces those results. The modern law of regulatory takings is
a well-established compromise between two unacceptable extremes.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' foundational opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon established this compromise. 53 In an opinion that is
more practical than theoretical in its focus, Holmes laid down the
oft-quoted starting point of regulatory takings analysis: "The general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 54 While this
50.

LEWIS, supra note 41, § 56, at 45.

51. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (declaring that for
purposes of the Takings Clause, the term "property" is not to be understood "in its vulgar and
untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by
law," but rather, to be understood "in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the
citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it").
52. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 n.6 (1980) ("The term 'property' as used in the Taking Clause includes
the entire 'group of rights inhering in the citizen's [ownership]."') (internal citation omitted).
53. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,412-16 (1922).
54. Id.at415.
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statement may be criticized for its imprecision (how far is "too far?") and
the mess that it has created,55 it does clearly reject two possible rules: one
that would allow the government essentially unlimited power to restrict the
use of private property for the public benefit without implicating the
Takings Clause, and another that would require the government to
compensate owners whenever it restricted previously lawful uses of private
property. Both bright-line extremes, while perhaps easy to articulate on
theoretical grounds, are simply out of bounds.
The Supreme Court has consistently accepted these parameters in its
regulatory takings decisions. 56 Indeed, while the justices have often widely
disagreed over the scope of the regulatory takings doctrine, it is remarkable
that in the eighty years since Mahon was decided, no justice has suggested
that the regulatory takings doctrine be reconsidered (or be limited to cases
of physical occupation),57 nor has any justice suggested that the regulatory
takings doctrine should encompass all new restrictions on the use of private
property. 58 All seem to agree that either extreme would be unacceptable.
Most scholars have agreed with these parameters, but two exceptions
are worth considering. In a prominent book and series of articles, Richard
Epstein has argued for a bold interpretation of the Takings Clause that
would recognize all new governmental regulations of property to be
takings. 59 We may call this the economic status-quo theory of takings.
According to Epstein, government must compensate for every diminution
in value it causes to owners by 0 restricting the use of property beyond
6
inherent common law limitations.
55. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
56.
For examples of such holdings, see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I
PlanningAgency, 535 U.S. 302, 320-24 (2002), and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18
(2001). Both cases reject a categorical rule embracing either extreme.
57. Justice Harry Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Lucas is revealing. While Justice Blackmun
argues that historically only physical invasions were recognized as takings, he stops short of arguing
that the Court should overrule Mahon, which held that a mere restriction on use may in some
circumstances amount to a taking. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1058-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1987) (finding no taking on
facts remarkably similar to those in Mahon, but accepting its broader regulatory takings principle).
58. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014-15 (recognizing limitations on the regulatory takings
doctrine).
See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
59.
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter TAKINGS].

60.

See id. at 70-72, 107-20.
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At the other end of the spectrum, Peter Byrne has argued for what may
61
be called an environmental status-quo theory of the takings clause.
According to Byrne, legal restrictions on an owner's use of private
property, even if absolute, should never be considered takings of
63
property; 62 rather, only physical intrusions are takings of private property.
Beyond physical intrusions, the regulatory takings doctrine should be
64
abolished.
Both theories of the Takings Clause are logically consistent-a feature
lacking in current law. Both also may be reconciled with a bundle-of-rights
view of property. 65 So why should they be considered out of bounds?
Epstein's baseline would produce consequences that are too drastic for
society to manage and that would be inconsistent with any plausible
original understanding of the Clause. His theory would disserve both
republican and economic values. As Justice Holmes observed in Mahon,
"[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law." 66 Epstein's theory suggests not only that all modern land
use regulations are prima facie takings but also that any government
restriction or obligation that goes beyond mere codification of existing
common law rules is a taking, including all business and commercial
regulations, general criminal laws, health and safety laws, labor laws,
changes in liability rules, and even taxes.6 7 Such a rule for regulatory
takings would be equivalent to a constitutional requirement that all laws be
Pareto-optimal for those that are regulated; that is, government would have
no power to change the rules of society unless it ensured (through cash
compensation, if necessary) that no single owner of property was left
61. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 90-91. Byrne is not the only writer to question the modern
regulatory takings doctrine, although he is more explicit than others about the specific principle with
which he would replace it. Compare John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the
Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1156 (2000) (arguing that regulatory
takings law is misconceived and Mahon should be reconsidered), with Byrne, supra note 17, at 90-91,
138-42 (arguing that Mahon should be overruled, and proposing a statutory scheme designed to protect
private property interests while facilitating land use regulations aimed at environmental protection).
62. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 90-91, 136.
63. See id. at 90-93.
64. See id. at 90, 136.
65. See supra Part I.A.
66. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
67. See TAKINGS, supra note 59, at 95-104.
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economically disadvantaged by the change. 68
As even Epstein
69
acknowledges, this would bring modern government to a halting stop.
The Takings Clause was certainly never meant to prohibit all
regulations and taxes that leave some owners worse off.7" Moreover, few
would be willing to pay the price of such a rule. Many would argue that
government has the inherent power and responsibility to reallocate
economic benefits and burdens in the interests of distributive justice.7 1
Even putting aside this moral issue, however, the practical difficulties of
compensating thousands of property owners for even incidental
redistributions of property value would prevent most general changes in the
law. In law-and-economics terms, Epstein's baseline fails to maximize
social welfare. He is wrong to suggest that socially optimal regulations can
be expected to succeed because of government's ability to tax the
beneficiaries and compensate the losers.7 2 For many if not most types of
socially beneficial regulations, the transaction costs alone associated with
compensating every owner whose position is devalued (including the costs
of assessing all property value losses and benefits to widespread numbers
of owners, and litigating the amount of compensation where there are
disputes) would be staggering, and would frequently exceed the net
73
benefits that could be achieved from the law.
For these reasons, it should not be surprising that the law has
consistently recognized the power of government to regulate private
property without compensating owners for all diminutions in property
value.
68. See id. at 201. Epstein acknowledges that "just compensation" may be provided implicitly
through offsetting benefits caused by the same government scheme. Id. at 195-99. For example, a tax
is valid (although it is still a taking) if the revenue is used to benefit every taxpayer to the extent of the
amount paid. Ultimately, however, all owners must be fully compensated for all changes in
entitlements, if not through reciprocal in-kind compensation, then through cash compensation.
69. See id. at 281 (recognizing that his position "invalidates much of the twentieth century
legislation").
70. Even Robert Bork, who is more apt than most to accept Epstein's picture of government, has
remarked on its constitutional deficiency.

See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE

POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 230 (1990) (noting that while Epstein has written "a powerful work
of political theory," he has "not convincingly located that political theory in the Constitution").
71. For such an argument, one might turn to John Rawls, who argues that government has the
moral responsibility to provide for the equal distribution of all societal values, including income and
wealth, except to the extent that an unequal distribution works to everyone's advantage. See JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971).

72. See TAKINGS, supra note 59, at 331-34.
73. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 53 (3d ed. 1986) (explaining that
while the economic logic of eminent domain law may suggest that the government compensate all
people who are disadvantaged by a change in the law, practical difficulties prohibit this).
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Peter Byrne's contrasting baseline for regulatory takings is also
implausible. According to Byrne, only physical occupations should be
recognized as takings of private property; mere restrictions on the use of
property, no matter how severe, are never compensable. To be sure, this
rule would be less troubling than Epstein's. It is also one way to reconcile
the limited historical evidence of the original meaning of the Takings
Clause. 74 Byrne's theory, however, fails to make sense of the Takings
Clause principle. It draws an arbitrary boundary that does not protect
established notions of private property.
Suppose the federal government sells fifty acres of undeveloped land
to an entrepreneur for the purpose of building cabins. After the transaction,
the government imposes a new law restricting all access to the land and
declares the fifty acres to be a natural forest preserve. Are we to believe
that the framers of the Fifth Amendment would not have considered this to
75
be a taking of the property rights previously conveyed to the owner?
Surely, the principle of the Fifth Amendment that supports protecting an
owner's right to exclude others-which, according even to Byrne, cannot
74. Several writers have argued that, until the twentieth century, the Takings Clause was not
understood to encompass restrictions on the use of private property. See FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID
CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND WITHOUT PAYING
COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS 51 (1973); Hart, supra note 61, at 1099-1101; William Michael

Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 782 (1995). There is, however, some controversy as to when the doctrine of regulatory takings
first arose. See Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1212-14, 1259-60 (1996) (arguing that courts have recognized regulatory takings
since the early nineteenth century). In any event, the historical record seems inconclusive as to the
original understanding of the Takings Clause.
We do not know how the founding generation would have interpreted the Fifth Amendment in
relation to extreme land use deprivations that today give rise to regulatory takings claims. While it is
possible the founding generation would have agreed with Byrne's proposal to draw the line at physical
takings, other interpretations recognizing land use restrictions as takings are also historically plausible.
See generally Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings
Thesis "Goes Too Far," 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181 (1999) (arguing that there is insufficient evidence to
determine the original meaning of the Takings Clause, but that a regulatory takings interpretation is at
least as plausible as a rule limited to physical takings).
75. On similar facts, the Marshall Court held that such an action by the State of Georgia violated
the Contracts Clause (as well as other constitutional provisions). See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 130-42 (1810). The Court held that having sold certain property to the plaintiff, Georgia
was thereafter restrained "by general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by ... the
constitution [sic] of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the
premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and void." Id.
at 139. It is perhaps historical accident that after the Supreme Court retreated from this original
understanding of the Contracts Clause, and after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated many of the principles of the Bill of Rights against the states, the Court came to rely
principally on the Takings Clause for the same point of doctrine.
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be taken without compensation-must, to some degree, also protect an
owner's affirmative rights to possess and use private land.7 6 Without some
affirmative right to use, a right to exclude others would have little value or
significance.77
A regulatory takings principle based on the environmental status quo
fails to protect much that is accepted as private property. Such a rule
would leave certain types of estates (such as easements and profits) wholly
unprotected from government takings for such property could be eliminated
entirely by regulatory restrictions on use. Moreover, if land use restrictions
were wholly outside the domain of the Takings Clause, the government
could easily circumvent the Fifth Amendment and acquire the right to
occupy land at virtually no cost. It could simply achieve this by prohibiting
all use of a given parcel until its market value approaches zero, and then
78
acquire title through eminent domain at market value.
Given these implications, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court
has firmly recognized that a restriction on land use may at some level
amount to a taking of private property. The Court is not likely to
reconsider the Mahon compromise anytime soon.
B. THE TENSION BETWEEN PROPERTY THEORY AND TAKINGS OUTCOMES

So far, we have seen that the Supreme Court has committed itself to
two basic ideas in its regulatory takings jurisprudence: (1) The private
property that is protected by the Fifth Amendment consists of rights, not
things; and (2) the regulatory takings doctrine requires government to
compensate for some, but not all, changes in use restrictions that it may
impose. The muddle of regulatory takings law begins to arise because
these ideas are often viewed as conflicting.
76. Byrne would recognize laws that cause physical occupations of land as takings. See Byrne,
supra note 17, at 91. Thus, he would protect an owner's right to exclude others from regulatory
elimination, but would offer no similar protection to an owner's affirmative interest in entering and
using private land. Hence, Byrne's rule would favor human exclusion over affirmative land use as a
constitutional rule. Although this might make sense on the basis of modern ecological principles, as
Byrne claims it does, see id. at 131-36, it is unlikely that early Americans shared this bias towards
natural land preservation in their understanding of the Takings Clause.
77. As Alexander Hamilton once wrote, "What, in fact, is property but a fiction, without the
beneficial use of it?" 3 HAMILTON WORKS 34 (Putnam's ed.), as quoted in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 591 (1895) (Field, J., concurring).
78. This is more than a theoretical problem. Restricting land development for the purpose of
lowering or freezing property values prior to the acquisition of title by eminent domain is a recurring
governmental practice that has been addressed by the courts under the regulatory takings doctrine. See
STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 2-8(g)(6), at 201-03 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter EAGLE].
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Focusing on the bundle-of-rights conception of private property, one
might logically conclude (as Epstein does) 79 that all new restrictions on
land use are takings. 80 If I was allowed yesterday to use my land for
raising pigs, and today the government passes a new law prohibiting pigs
on my land, one might easily conclude that it has removed one of the rights
in my property bundle. But the same may be said for any new land use
restriction government may impose, no matter how insignificant or
common. To adopt this bundle-of-rights logic in an unqualified way would
be to violate the second premise. We know that government has the power
to alter restrictions on land use without paying for every such change in the
law.
Suppose, then, we qualify this understanding of property rights. As
Justice Robert Jackson recognized many years ago, "not all economic
interests are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages are 'rights'
which have the law back of them ... ."'8 One might currently enjoy the
advantage of raising pigs on private land without necessarily having a
82
property right to continue that land use practice in the future.
Recognizing that property rights must originate, not from the Constitution
itself but from "'an independent source such as state law,"' 83 we might
conclude that when a government grants an estate in land, it impliedly
reserves the power to restrict or modify what may be done with that land in
the public interest. 84 In other words, an owner's title in private property is
inherently qualified, from the outset, by the government's power to
regulate what is in the public interest. When the government alters the
rules of private land use, it does not take property in the constitutional
79. See TAKINGS, supra note 59, at 112-15.
80. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, in PROPERTY: NOMOS
XXII 351, 365 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) ("[If he or she accepted the
bundle-of-rights theory,] the Scientific Policymaker would have no choice but to interpret the Takings
Clause as... protecting all uses once they have been legally authorized. But the [constitutional] text
does not impose such an absurd command.").
81.
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
82. Even Blackstone acknowledged that the usage rights inherent in private property are not
absolute, but are qualified by "laws of the land." BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, § 191, at 239. For
further discussion of Blackstone's use of this phrase, see infra Part III.A.
83. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
84. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-7 (2d ed. 1988); Andrea L.
Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part 11-Takings As Intentional

Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 55, 62-63 (1990) [hereinafter
Underlying Principles].
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sense, but merely
exercises a preexisting sovereign right with respect to
85
that property.
The difficulty with taking this reasoning too far, however, is that it too
would violate the Mahon compromise. There is no regulation that could
not, in principle, be described as an exercise of inherent sovereign power to
protect the public interest.8 6 Taken to the extreme, government could even
use the reserved-power logic to justify outright physical occupation of land
without compensation, which historically the sovereign thought it could do
before there was a Takings Clause. If there is to be some meaningful role
for the Takings Clause, it cannot be that all property rights are inherently
subject to any form of re-regulation without compensation.
The bundle-of-rights concept of property, therefore, presents a
dilemma for regulatory takings law. Rather than assist courts in
determining what is a regulatory taking, it may be misleading. Taken in
one extreme form, a rights-based approach to the Takings Clause leads to a
regulatory takings doctrine that is too broad; in another form, it leads to the
elimination of regulatory takings. In fact, writers have criticized the
bundle-of-rights concept both on the grounds that it gives too much
88
protection to private property87 and on the grounds that it gives too little.
85. The Supreme Court has frequently used this insight to explain why new restrictions designed
to prevent public harms do not require compensation. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) ("It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his
property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in
legitimate exercise of its police powers .. "); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987) ("Long ago it was recognized that 'all property in this country is held under
the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community,' and the
Takings Clause did not transform that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the State
asserts its power to enforce it.") (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 655 (1887)) (internal
citations omitted).
86. Indeed, Byrne uses this argument to conclude that the regulatory takings doctrine should be
abolished. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 115-17.
87. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 46, at 1193-94 (arguing that the bundle metaphor makes it too
difficult to delineate between that which is property, and thus properly protected, and that which is
simply a fragment thereof); Wenar, supra note 40, at 1927-28 ("[O]nce [the bundle-of-rights]
conception of property as rights was in place, it became almost irresistible to conclude that...
government action that alters any existing private property right is a 'taking' of property."); Kordesh,
supra note 36, at 433 (demonstrating how one can argue for a total taking of any right by separating it
from the bundle and construing it "as a separate whole thing," which would thereby provide extremely
broad protection under the Takings Clause).
88. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 239 (1990) ("If property is not

a 'thing,' . .. but a bundle of legal entitlements subject, like any other, to rational manipulation and
distribution in accordance with some vision of public policy, then it can serve neither a real nor a
symbolic function as boundary between individual rights and governmental authority.") (internal
citation omitted). See also EAGLE, supra note 78, § 2-4(a)(3), at 83 (explaining the criticism of the
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The puzzle of regulatory takings law is to define an owner's usage
rights in a principled way that is consistent with the parameters of Mahon.
If this cannot be done, the property rights premise of regulatory takings law
must be false, and the regulatory takings doctrine is nothing more than a
device to further current judicial policies and deserves to be abolished. If it
is possible to identify an owner's right to use in terms that are both
consistent in theory and reasonable in outcome, however, it is possible both
to restore legitimacy to the regulatory takings doctrine and provide a
unifying framework for future cases.
II. PROPERTY AS A BUNDLE OF POLICIES: MUDDLED
EXPLANATIONS FOR CURRENT LAW
The Supreme Court has not resolved the tension between the
property-as-rights basis for the regulatory takings doctrine and the outcome
that only some restrictions on property are compensable. It has never
clearly explained what usage rights are inherent in a typical fee simple
estate so as to clarify why some land use restrictions conflict with property
rights while others do not. As a consequence, there is a gap between
takings theory and takings outcomes that must be bridged.
There are various ways in which one might explain current law in
light of this gap, some of which are implied in the cases. One might
explain the regulatory takings doctrine as a necessary deviation from the
constitutional text, or one might explain it in terms of a qualified definition
of property. Either way, as long as we perceive property solely as a fixed,
noncomparative right, none of these theories fully legitimates the
regulatory takings doctrine, or provides a coherent framework for future
development. While purporting to recognize property as a right, takings
law seems more accurately to reflect an ad hoc bundle of policies.
A. NONTEXTUAL APPROACHES

In some cases, the Court appears to assume an extreme definition of
property, but declines to take such a definition to its logical conclusion for
functional reasons. This dissonance may result from assuming a definition
of private property that is either too strong or too weak to support
reasonable outcomes. If property is assumed to be strong, we must
bundle-of-rights approach by property rights and public rights advocates). See generally Thomas C.
Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1980) (arguing that the logic of the bundle-of-rights view of property threatens to
eliminate its special status).
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concede that government may take property in small increments without
compensation to make room for modern government. If property is
assumed to be weak, the regulatory takings doctrine becomes a necessary
vehicle for requiring compensation in cases where the government has not
literally taken property. Either way, the regulatory takings doctrine is
treated as a deviation from constitutional text, rather than an application of
it.
1. Strong Conception of Property Minus the Petty Larceny of the Police
Power
Sometimes the Court has assumed, consistent with Epstein's baseline,
that every conceivable use of private land that was not historically
prohibited is a property right. Thus, when a new law restricts a previously
legal use, it is technically a taking of at least one strand in the owner's
bundle of property. Because we know that society cannot afford to pay for
every change in the law, however, one is forced by this baseline to
conclude that the Takings Clause cannot be applied literally. Small,
uncompensated takings must be tolerated in the name of the police power.
Government must be allowed to deprive owners of some property rights;
compensation will be required only when government takes too much of
any one person's property, or if it takes the wrong kind of property. It is up
to the courts to decide which takings of private property require
compensation.
This was the perspective of Justice Holmes, which may explain some
of his discussion in Mahon.89 Holmes believed that there is no qualitative
difference between takings of private property and legitimate exercises of
the police power, only differences of degree. 90 In one draft opinion,
written the same year as Mahon, Holmes wrote of "the petty larceny of the
police power" to explain why compensation was not generally required for
regulatory burdens. 9' He removed the language from the opinion at the
89.
See generally Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'
Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.

Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996) (providing a thorough discussion of Holmes' philosophy on private
property and the police power, and its relationship to the Mahon opinion).
90. Id. at 622-23 & n.40.
91.
1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD
J. LASKI, 1916-1935, at 457 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI]. The case

at issue was Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922), decided during the same year as Mahon.
See HOLMES-LASKI, supra, at 456 n.1.
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request of his colleagues; 92 but consistent with the idea, Holmes later
explained in Mahon that "to some extent values incident to property [may]
... be diminished,, 93 and wrote that whether compensation is required for
governmental action "is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be
disposed of by general propositions."9 4 In a later dissenting opinion,
Holmes further clarified his view, stating that "some property may be taken
or destroyed for public use without paying for it, if you do not take too
much."95
The nontextual idea that we must allow government to appropriate
some private property without compensation, as long as it does not
appropriate too much, also appears in some modern takings cases. In
Andrus v. Allard, the Court explained paradoxically: "[T]he denial of one
traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least
where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction
of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety. '"96 According to Andrus, whether a "denial" of
property is compensable depends on how many rights are left over in an
owner's bundle. Andrus implies apologetically that while an owner may
have a right to engage in a particular use, government may deny that right
without compensation as long as it does not deny too many rights at once. 97
Perhaps even more remarkable, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council also implies that there is a petty-larceny exception to the Takings
Clause. 98 This becomes apparent when one tries to reconcile the Lucas
deprivation-of-all-use rule with the awkward exception to that rule stated in
the same case. The Lucas exception holds that government does not take
private property when it restricts conduct that already was restricted under
92. See id. at 457. Although Holmes never published the phrase, "petty larceny of the police
power," the concept continues to influence modern legal thought. It is likely "one of the most famous
phrases ever deleted from a draft Supreme Court opinion .... " J. Gregory Sidak, The Petty Larceny of
the Police Power, 86 CAL. L. REV. 655, 656 (1998) (reviewing FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR
NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997)).

93. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).
94. Id. at416.
95. Springer v. Gov't of Phil. Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 210 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
96. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (internal citations omitted).
97. See id. Although the Court attempts to make a semantic distinction between a "taking" of
property and a "denial" of property, this does not solve the textual problem. Either a "taking for public
use" must include the regulatory destruction of existing private property rights for the public's benefit
(as regulatory takings law supposes that it does), or it does not. To suggest that the meaning of "take"
changes from a regulatory concept to a physical concept according to how much property an owner has
is not consistent with reasonable English usage. Andrus is better interpreted as reflecting Holmes'
perspective that we must tolerate some government pilfering of private property without compensation.
98. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-31 (1992).
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the common law of nuisance. 99 This exception is based on a historically
fixed understanding of an owner's usage rights, similar to Epstein's
conception. 100 According to the Court, a land use restriction is not a taking
"only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of [the owner's]
title to begin with."' 10 ' For purposes of this antecedent inquiry, only
restrictions that duplicate the common law of nuisance or other actual
historical restrictions are considered to be outside the scope of an owner's
title. 102
The narrowness of Lucas' background-principles exception shows that
it is based on a broad and fixed understanding of an owner's usage rights in
private property. By the same reasoning, however, one should also
conclude that if a particular use is permitted by background principles of
law, then it constitutes a usage right that the government may not eliminate
without compensation. This is, of course, what Epstein concludes.' 0 3 In
other words, what the Court calls the "logically antecedent inquiry" into the
nature of the owner's estate should logically be the only inquiry. But
Lucas rejects this outcome for functional reasons.' 0 4 Contrary to the
reasoning used for purposes of the nuisance exception, Lucas holds that
government takes property only when it (a) eliminates an owner's existing
usage rights (as defined by background principles of law) and (b) deprives
the owner of all economically viable use of the land. 10 5 To make room for
the practical demands of government, Lucas reflects the assumption that
the term "private property," as used in the Takings Clause, cannot be taken
too literally when deciding what government actions are compensable.
Lucas suggests that because society cannot afford to pay for every property
99.

See id.

100.
See TAKINGS, supra note 59, at 112-20 (endorsing a no-taking finding in cases where a
regulation codifies existing common law principles, and advocating broad application of a regulatory
takings doctrine).

101.

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).

102.
To come within the exception, a regulation must "do no more than duplicate the result that
could have been achieved in the courts" under background principles of state law. Id. at 1029.
103.
See TAKINGS, supra note 59, at 112-15.
104.
According to the Court,
[T]hefunctional basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to affect property values
without compensation-that 'Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law[]'-does not apply to the relatively rare situations where the government has
deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses.
505 U.S. at 1018 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922)).
105.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-29.
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right that is denied by regulation, the Court will require compensation only
06
for large deprivations. 1
2. Weak Conception of Property Plus the Power of Judges Occasionally to
Order Compensation
One might as easily begin with the opposite assumption that the
meaning of private property in the Fifth Amendment is weak. All property
interests are inherently qualified by the police power and subject to
whatever restrictions government might impose at any time. Therefore, an
owner's bundle of rights does not actually include usage rights against the
government in any strict sense-an owner only has temporary rights to
engage in land uses that the government does not prohibit. 10 7 Accepting
this assertion as a baseline meaning of property, the regulatory takings
doctrine must be considered a judge-made supplement to the actual takings
doctrine based on the demands of natural equity. It reflects the judiciary's
willingness to scrutinize the effects of government regulations and to order
compensation where justice and fairness require it, even in cases where the
government has not taken actual property rights.
Some Supreme Court cases imply this activist explanation for the
regulatory takings doctrine, including the Court's recent decision in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency. 0 8 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens stated: "The text of the
Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinction between
physical takings and regulatory takings."' 1 9 The Court further explained
that whereas the physical takings doctrine is "as old as the Republic" ' 10 and
106. Some of the most influential takings scholarship, including that of Frank Michelman and
Margaret Jane Radin, supports this perspective. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600, 1627-28 (1988) ("IT]he better we learn the analytical lesson.., that every particle of
legally sanctioned advantage is property-the more we ire forced to recognize in every act of
government a redefinition and adjustment of a property boundary.") (internal citation omitted).
Michelman concludes that popular sovereignty and classical property cannot be fully reconciled, but
must be balanced with situated judgment. Id. See also Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of
Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1680-84 (1988)

(arguing that the classical liberal conception of property, taken to its logical conclusion, would lead to
an overbroad and impractical takings doctrine, and endorsing a pragmatic and standard-based approach
to regulatory takings).
107. Modern use-zoning may reflect the assumption that title to land does not include inherent
usage rights against the government. Use-zoning typically prohibits all land uses except for those that
are expressly permitted or conditionally permitted in the zone. The list of permitted uses, of course, is
always subject to revision.
108. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
109.
110.

ld. at 321.
Id. at 322.
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arises from the text of the Takings Clause,"' the regulatory takings
doctrine comes from judicial precedent 112 and is based on "the concepts of
'fairness and justice' that underlie the Takings Clause .... ,11
" 3 Employing
a narrow interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, the Court treats the
regulatory takings question as an open-ended fairness inquiry. 1 4 Rather
than ask whether the government has appropriated private property rights
(thereby creating a duty to compensate under the Takings Clause), the
Court describes the issue as whether "'justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government .... "115 Other regulatory takings cases at times have implied
this weak property-plus perspective." 6 Scholars also frequently discuss the
Takings Clause in these terms, particularly those who criticize the current
scope of the regulatory takings doctrine, but would not abandon it
entirely. ' 17
The flaw of both the strong property-minus and the weak
property-plus perspectives is the same: They lack plausible textual
legitimacy. They are excuses for deviating from the Fifth Amendment,
rather than applications of it. Rather than reconsider the assumed
boundaries of private property to account for both the reserved powers of
government and affirmative rights of owners, these approaches give up on
reconciling any firm conception of private property with acceptable
outcomes under current law. With no plausible grounding in a consistent
definition of private property, the regulatory takings doctrine becomes
8
subject to charges of judicial activism, even Lochnerism.l1
111.
112.
gave birth
113.

Id. at 321-22.
See id. at 325 ("[lIt was Justice Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that
to our regulatory takings jurisprudence.") (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 334 (emphasis added).

114.

See id. at 315 n.10, 334-35 (discussing the factors that are relevant to consideration of

"fairness and justice").
115, Id. at 336 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
116, See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522-23 (1998) (noting that a "classic taking"
occurs when government "directly appropriates private property for its own use," but that "fairness and
justice" considerations nevertheless may require compensation for deprivations caused by some
governmental regulations); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-93
(1987) ("[Use] restrictions are 'properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship."')
(quoting Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1,5 (1949)).
117.
See, e.g., Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 4, at 718-21; Treanor, supra note 74, at 782-85;
Bernard Schwartz, Takings Clause-"PoorRelation" No More?, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 417,419-28 (1994)

(arguing that the text and history of the Fifth Amendment require compensation only for physical
acquisitions, but acknowledging a role for the regulatory takings doctrine in limited circumstances).
118. The criticism that modern regulatory takings doctrine is nothing more than a disguised
version of Lochnerism arises frequently. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994)

1028

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 76:1003

Moreover, it has no guiding standard for further development. With
no principle other than "fairness and justice" to navigate the wide expanse
between treating every property restraint as a taking and allowing
government absolute power to restrain property, every unresolved takings
issue must be a political one. It is no wonder that those who view
regulatory takings doctrine in such terms are so fond of ad hoc decisions
and public policy balancing, rather than adherence to rules and boundaries.
They do not view the regulatory takings doctrine as law in any formal
11 9
sense, only an opportunity for the exercise of judicial power.
B. FLAWED SUBSTANTIVE APPROACHES
Rather than adopt an extreme conception of property that pits us
against the text of the Constitution, suppose we try to explain the regulatory
takings doctrine in terms of a moderate definition of private property. One
might suppose that real property includes certain usage rights that
government may not eliminate without compensation, but the right to use
must be identified in limited terms. It must be defined narrowly enough to
allow for ongoing government regulation, and yet broadly enough to allow
some place for regulatory takings.
While a restrained concept of property seems plausible in the abstract,
courts and scholars have so far found it impossible to identify a substantive
right to use in terms that are internally consistent and produce reasonable
outcomes. Let us take the Lucas and Penn Central standards as starting
points. Lucas holds that a regulation is a taking if it deprives an owner of
all economically viable use of land. Penn Centraladds that a regulation is
a taking if, in consideration of many factors, it would be unfair to deny the
owner compensation. Suppose we invert these standards and use them to
define an owner's bundle of rights. In other words, let us posit that two
inherent rights in every undivided bundle of real property include a right to
use land for some minimal economic gain and a right to use land absent
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting "the Court's resurrection of a species of substantive due process
analysis that it firmly rejected decades ago") (internal citation omitted); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of
Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605
(1996); Freitag, supra note 4, at 774-76. We should take this criticism seriously, especially to the
extent that we abandon the effort to justify a limited regulatory takings doctrine under the text of the
Fifth Amendment.
119. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 106, at 1627-29. Michelman argues that all bright line
rules are bound to be contrived in the field of regulatory takings, although they may function as
"tokens" for a rule of law ideal. See id. According to Michelman, society's desire for both classical
property and popular sovereignty cannot be reconciled, and so it must ultimately reach a compromise
through the exercise of "situated judgment." See id.
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unreasonable or unfair restrictions.
By defining property in these
substantive terms, it may seem that we can reconcile the Lucas and Penn
Central rules with a singular conception of property.
But further
examination reveals that these conceptions of property rights are internally
flawed. They do not treat property as a consistent entitlement.
1. A Right to Use for Economic Gain: The Nuisance and Denominator
Problems
The Lucas rule may presuppose that ownership of real property
includes a fixed right to use land for some minimal economic gain, even if
120
there is no inherent right to use land for its most profitable purpose.
121
Putting aside the difficult question of what is an economically viable use,
there are two reasons why such a right is implausible.
First, as the Court concedes in Lucas, society has never recognized a
fixed right to use private land for economic gain. That is why the Court
must make an awkward exception to its holding for the common law of
nuisance and other "background principles" of law.122 Frequently, a parcel
of land will have no economically productive use, except for uses that the
common law or general criminal laws prohibit. It is unconvincing to claim
that the Takings Clause endows an owner with a "right to use for economic
gain" if all historical laws, general laws, and even the common law of
nuisance must be framed as exceptions to that right. Property is a common
law concept. Accordingly, the common law of nuisance ought to be among
the strongest pieces of evidence of how society has traditionally understood
an owner's usage rights. If title to real property includes a right to use, that
right must plausibly be framed in terms that are consistent with the
common law of nuisance, rather than admittedly in conflict with it.
Second, a supposed "right to use for economic gain" is inconsistent
with property as a fungible right. This arises because of the takings
120. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). The Court stated:
[O]ur 'takings' jurisprudence... has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our
citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they
acquire when they obtain title to property. It seems to us that the property owner necessarily
expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly
enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers ....
Id.
121.
See Oswald, supra note 17, at 120-24 (discussing the ambiguity of the "economically viable
use" concept).
122. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-29 (discussing the background-principles exception). The Court
also suggests that there may be an exception to its holding for laws of general applicability that are not
directed at land use. See id. at 1027 n.14.
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denominator problem.' 23 Whether a person is deemed to have lost all
economically viable use of his or her land depends on the relevant parcel of
land that is used as the basis for comparison.
For example, under Lucas, if a person owns one acre of land and the
law prohibits all use of that acre, the owner will be entitled to
compensation. But if the owner happens to own two adjacent acres of land,
and the law prohibits all use of one acre, the owner likely would not qualify
for compensation-the government could argue that the owner is still able
to use some of the two-acre parcel for some economic use.' 24 This odd
result is possible because the Supreme Court has said that the effect of a
regulation must be measured against the "parcel as a whole"; that is, a
landowner is not allowed to divide real property into conceptual segments
for purposes of claiming that those individual segments have been totally
25
abrogated while ignoring other property interests that are still viable.'
Otherwise, every setback ordinance and building height restriction would
be a taking of private property because they completely prohibit the owner
from using certain geographic space. 126 Taken to the extreme, the practice
of "conceptual severance" could even lead to the result that all restrictions
27
are takings of private property.
Although the Supreme Court has not fully defined the "parcel as a
whole,"' 28 and lower courts vary somewhat in their approach to the issue,
123.

For a more thorough discussion of the takings denominator problem and one proposed

solution, see JOHN E. FEE, Of Parcels and Property, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND

PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 101 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the
Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994). These works propose a
definition of the parcel based on independent economic viability.
124. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 (2001) (holding that an owner did not
suffer a categorical taking under Lucas, even though a regulation prohibited all economic use of
approximately eighteen acres, because some use remained for some of the owner's land).
125. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326-27
(2002); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
126. But it has long been settled, even since the Lochner era, that reasonable height and setback
restrictions are valid without compensation. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 327
("[R]estrictions on the use of only limited portions of the parcel, such as setback ordinances, or a
requirement that coal pillars be left in place to prevent mine subsidence, [are] not considered regulatory
takings.") (internal citations omitted); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608-10 (1927) (holding that a
setback restriction was not a taking); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 104-08 (1909) (holding that a
height restriction was not a taking).
127. See Radin, supra note 106, at 1674-78. Radin explains that conceptual severance "isan easy
slippery slope to the radical Epstein position," for "[elvery curtailment of any of the liberal indicia of
property, every regulation of any portion of an owner's 'bundle of sticks,' is a taking of the whole of
that particular portion considered separately." Id. at 1678.
128. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (questioning the application of the whole-parcel rule in some
contexts, but declining to resolve the issue because such a context was not presented in the instant
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most courts entertain at least a strong presumption that all contiguous land
held by a single owner is to be treated as a single unified parcel.1 29 It may
be necessary to consider an owner's property as an undivided whole to
avoid extreme results under the deprivation-of-all-use standard. To engage
130
in such "conceptual agglomeration" (as Steven Eagle has described it),
however, is to violate the concept of property as a set of fungible
entitlements. Large landowners are disadvantaged in their constitutional
rights compared to small landowners for no apparent constitutional reason
other than to find some limit to the regulatory takings doctrine.
Paradoxically, this encourages one to increase the rights inherent in a
bundle of private property by subdividing it among owners. Under the
parcel-as-a-whole rule, a bundle of rights does not equal the sum of its
component parts.131
The takings denominator problem reveals a serious conceptual flaw
with the Lucas rule. To demonstrate the nature of this problem, it is useful
to contrast the takings denominator problem with another difficult (but less
troubling) denominator question in the law: the relevant market question in
antitrust law. In an antitrust case, the legality of a firm's conduct is
determined in part by measuring the firm's market strength in relation to
some defined market for goods and services.' 32 The smaller the relevant
market, the more likely a firm will appear to exercise excessive market
power. A firm accused of antitrust violations, therefore, has an incentive to
define the relevant market as broadly as possible, while those accusing the
firm of antitrust violations have an incentive to define the relevant market
as narrowly as possible in relation to the defendant's products.
This dynamic is similar to the relevant parcel problem in takings law.
In both contexts, the broader the denominator of the equation, the more
likely the defendant's conduct will be excused. But unlike the takings
case); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) ("Regrettably, the rhetorical force
of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does
not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured.").
129. See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 880 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999); K & K Constr.,
Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Mich. 1998); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548
N.W.2d 528, 532-33 (Wis. 1996).
130.

See EAGLE, supra note 78, § II -7(b)(2), at 788-90.

131. Justice Louis Brandeis raised
Co. v. Mahon. See 260 U.S. 393, 419
takings law continues to focus on what is
than solely on what rights are affected by

this criticism in his dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania Coal
(1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). As long as the regulatory
left over in an owner's bundle of rights after regulation, rather
regulation, these anomalies will inevitably exist.

See PHILLIP E. AREEDA, JOHN L. SOLOW & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
132.
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 531, at 187-90 (2d ed. 2002).
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denominator, the antitrust denominator is not based on arbitrary factors.
The defining factors of the relevant market in antitrust are based directly on
the primary policy of antitrust law: the preservation of marketplace
competition.1 33 If a court finds the relevant market to be broad, it will be
precisely because other firms are found to provide adequate competition
through similar products, revealing that the defendant's conduct is unlikely
to cause anticompetitive harm. If it finds the relevant market to be small, it
will be because, from a consumer point of view, there are few products that
provide an adequate substitute for the defendant's products, revealing that
anticompetitive harm is likely. While the relevant market inquiry often
presents a difficult factual question, it is conceptually sound because it
furthers the purpose of antitrust law.
By contrast, the takings denominator issue seems to exist solely
because we have not found a better way to avoid the extreme result of
requiring the government to compensate for all changes in the law. 134 We
might as well say that all property owners who earn more than a certain
income are not entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment so as
to make it less expensive for government to regulate.' 35 Unless some
reason exists why the Takings Clause should be concerned with deterring
citizens from owning too much property at once, the quantity of property
an owner holds should have nothing to do with whether a regulation of one
part of an owner's property is a taking of that part. The takings
denominator problem is more than a "difficult, persisting question"',3 6 that
the Supreme Court continues to avoid. It is a conceptual black hole. It
reveals a fatal flaw in the supposition that there is a fixed right to use land
for economic gain: Such a right cannot be reconciled with a stable theory of
private property.
2. A Right to Use Absent Unfair Restrictions: A Problem of What to
Balance
The Penn Central balancing test raises similar problems when one
attempts to restate it in property rights terms. Penn Central may
presuppose that a landowner's bundle of entitlements includes a right to use
133.
134.

See United States v. E. 1.du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956).
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); Radin, supra

note 106, at 1677-78.

135. Indeed, as Carol Rose has pointed out, the whole parcel rule effectively turns the Takings
Clause into a deep-pocket rule. See Rose, supra note 17, at 568. If a deep-pocket rule were intended,
however, we would do even better by basing the regulatory takings question on overall income and
wealth, rather than solely on adjacent land interests.
136.

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
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land absent unreasonable or unfair restrictions.
Typical land use
restrictions do not conflict with private property; but when government
imposes an unusually heavy regulatory burden on an owner that "in all
fairness and justice should[] be borne by the public as a whole," it deprives
137
the owner of the right to use, and must compensate for it.
The difficulty with this interpretation of Penn Central arises in
determining what is an unfair restriction. The factors that Penn Central
says to balance-the economic impact on the owner, interference with the
owner's investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action 138-- cannot be reconciled with a classical conception
of property rights. Indeed, each of the Penn Central factors is flawed.
Economic Impact. According to Penn Central, the greater the adverse
economic impact on an owner, the more likely a law will be deemed a
taking of private property. 139 The problem presented by the economic
impact factor is that it gives rise to a denominator problem. Whether an
economic impact is so great as to exceed what is fair and just is measured
in relation to the value of the owner's property bundle as a whole. 140 The
economic impact (or diminution in value) factor, therefore, depends
directly on how much adjacent or contiguous property the owner has.
Because of the denominator problem 14 1 and whole parcel rule,' 42 the
economic impact factor cannot be squared with a fixed, substantive
conception of property. It turns the Takings Clause into a deep-pocket rule.
It also means that when a single estate is partitioned and subdivided among
numerous owners, the sum of private usage rights increases as the
government's power of regulation decreases; or, when an owner purchases
and unites multiple estates into a single estate, the sum of private usage
rights decreases as the government's police power increases. This is
137. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123-24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40,49 (1960)).
138. Id. at 124.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 130-31.
141. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). The Court
stated:
Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been taken
from the property with the value that remains in the property, one of the critical questions is
determining how to define the unit of property "whose value is to furnish the denominator of
the fraction."
Id. (internal citation omitted).
142. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("[For takings considerations,] where an
owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights ... the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.")
(internal citations omitted); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31 (declaring that the takings
jurisprudence focuses on the economic impact on "the parcel as a whole").
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fundamentally inconsistent with the classical idea of property as a fungible
entitlement. 143
Economic impact is also illogical as an instrument to determine
whether there is a taking of private property for it also measures the amount
of compensation due when government has taken property. 14 The degree
of economic impact is already factored into the compensation step. It
distorts and confuses the analysis to consider it also as part of the threshold
question of whether there is a taking. If the regulatory takings doctrine is
based on the theory that property usage rights may not be eliminated
without compensation, the degree of economic impact should not affect
whether a government has taken private property. It should only affect the
45
amount of compensation due in the event of a taking.'
Investment-Backed Expectations. The Supreme Court's suggestion
that regulatory takings law balances an owner's investment-backed
expectations also fails to fit a stable conception of property rights. The
Court has never been entirely clear about how to weigh an owner's
investment-backed expectations. 146 But to the extent that the law gives
143. See Radin, supra note 106, at 1685 ("In the classical liberal conception, property is
paradigmatically fungible; everything that is property is ipso facto tradeable in markets and has an
objective market value.... There is no room in the classical liberal conception for things that are
property and yet not commodified.").
144. When government takes part of a parcel of real property, just compensation generally
includes the market value of the portion taken, offset by any increase or decrease in value caused to the
owner's remaining property interest. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574-75 (1897).
145.
Richard Epstein has argued persuasively that the current law's focus on the "deprivation
fraction" for purposes of identifying a regulatory takings conflates the takings inquiry with the just
compensation inquiry. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled
Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1376-77 (1993).

146. See Oswald, supra note 17, at 106-17 (discussing the test's inherent ambiguities). Since
Justice William Brennan first used the phrase "distinct investment-backed expectations" in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), its meaning has evolved
somewhat. See Oswald, supra note 17, at 106-07. Justice William Rehnquist changed the phrase to
"reasonable investment backed expectations," see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175
(1979), and many cases quote it in this form. In other cases, justices have simply referred to the
"reasonable expectation" of the owner. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016
n.7 (1992) (suggesting that investment-backed expectations may not be essential); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 888 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
One might interpret the expectations factor as referring simply to those objective expectations
that are inherent in owning property of a particular type, not to the individual circumstances or
psychology of the owner. At this level of generality, however, focusing on "reasonable owner
expectations" merely begs the following question: What usage rights are inherent in an owner's
property bundle? It does not point to any independent factors to balance in measuring an owner's rights
in relation to the government. As Justice Anthony Kennedy has noted, "It]here is an inherent tendency
towards circularity" in applying regulatory takings law on the basis of objective expectations, see
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring), yet it is at least preferable to measuring an owner's
property rights on the basis of subjective factors.
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independent weight to this factor, it suggests that an owner who purchases
private property for valuable consideration is more likely to receive
compensation in the event of a regulatory loss than one who acquires the
same property by gift or inheritance. 147 This reasoning also seems to
suggest that one who acquires property with active development plans is
more likely to receive compensation than one who acquires it as a passive
investment. Whether or not these distinctions make sense in terms of
abstract justice, they plainly do not treat property as a consistent fungible
entitlement. Under a bundle-of-rights conception of the regulatory takings
doctrine, an owner's rights in relation to the government cannot vary
according to how the property was acquired or what the owner subjectively
expected to do with the property. Whatever rights are inherent in
Blackacre must remain constant as Blackacre is transferred from one owner
to another, or else Blackacre is not property in the traditional sense.
Character/PublicInterest. The Penn Central framework also requires
an examination of the "character of the governmental action." The Court
has interpreted this criterion flexibly. It has invoked the character criterion
to hold that regulations interfering with an owner's right to exclude or right
to devise are takings because such rights are fundamental sticks in an
owner's bundle. 48 In the context of land use restrictions, however, courts
typically interpret the character criterion as an instruction to balance the
public interest. A land use restriction is generally not a taking if it
reasonably promotes "the health, safety, morals, or general welfare" of
society, even if it "significantly" diminishes property values. 149 A land use
restriction, however, does require compensation "if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests .
"...,,150
The greater the
public interest in imposing a restriction, the less likely the government will
be required to pay compensation.151
There exists a fundamental problem, however, with using the degree
of public interest as a factor to define the boundaries of private property for
compensation purposes. The Takings Clause presupposes that government
may take private property only "for public use," or in other words, to serve
147. In comparison, Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987), suggests that investment-backed
expectations are lacking where property is acquired by gift, descent, or devise, and where the original
owners did not have specific expectations at the time of investment in passing on the land.
148. See id.; KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80 (discussing the right to exclude).
149. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125, 131.
150.

Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).

151. Rubenfeld, supra note 26, at 1094-97. Jed Rubenfeld has commented on this irony: "Is it not
peculiar that the more society gains, the less chance an individual has of being compensated for the use
society makes of his property?" Id. at 1095.
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a legitimate governmental interest. 52 If a government action fails to serve
a legitimate public purpose, the proper remedy is invalidation, not
compensation.1 53 Unlike many other constitutional doctrines that must
balance the public interest, the just compensation requirement of the Fifth
Amendment is not designed to prohibit invalid governmental action; it is
more accurately concerned with who should bear the cost of legitimate
governmental action.' 5 4 When government takes private property for the
purpose of building a police station, we do not refuse compensation
because the action supports an important governmental interest. As Justice
Holmes wrote in Mahon, "a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change."' 5 5 Whatever the
boundaries of private property for purposes of the Takings Clause, those
boundaries should not vary according to the degree of public interest at
stake. The fact that the public will benefit greatly by depriving an owner of
property rights might be all the more reason to compensate the owner from
public funds, rather than force one owner to bear that burden alone.
If each of the Penn Central factors is flawed in isolation, the concept
of property is not improved by combining those factors into an amorphous
balancing framework committed to no set rule. Doing so only compounds
the problem. By making abstract fairness the ultimate test of whether
compensation is due, without developing a clear framework by which to
measure it, the Court's ad hoc takings jurisprudence contradicts the idea
that the Takings Clause protects previously defined entitlements. If there is
a convincing way to identify an owner's right to use based on a balancing
test, the courts have not yet discovered it.
152. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-44 (1984) (holding that a government
taking that reasonably serves the public interest satisfies the "public use" requirement).
153. See id. at 241. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "'one person's property may not
be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though
compensation be paid."' Id. (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)).
154. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. I, 11-12 (1996); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987). Seemingly at odds with a public interest
criterion, the Supreme Court has explained that the Takings Clause is not meant to limit "the
governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." Id. at 315.
155. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,416 (1922).
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C. TlE FLAWED CONCEPT OF PROPERTY As AN INDIVIDUAL ECONOMIC
ENTITLEMENT

Neither the Lucas deprivation-of-all-economically-viable-use rule nor
the Penn Central test can be squared with a substantive conception of

property usage rights. Both standards rely on factors that, in principle,
ought to be irrelevant to whether the government has deprived an owner of
property. Are we to conclude that regulatory takings law is not really about
protecting private property, as such? Is it a judge-made deviation from the
principle of property, rather than a reflection of what usage rights are in an
owner's bundle?
To the extent that we view the Takings Clause as an individualized
protection against government-imposed economic burdens, the answer
must be yes. If the only criteria we have to define an owner's usage rights
are the individual's economic interest in using property, the government's
interest in regulating property, and background regulations, then there is no
rational way to distinguish between those property restrictions that require
compensation and those that do not. We have long understood that
government has the authority to restrict what citizens may do on private
land without paying for every restriction. Moreover, the government's
power to determine what is in the public interest has never been static; it
must be flexible enough to respond to new social conditions, new public
attitudes, and new conceptions of harm. We have long understood that
changes in general regulations (like other government decisions) will often
severely affect a person's financial position, including the market value of
private property. This is an inherent risk in democracy to which all private
56
property is subject.1
Moreover, if the Takings Clause were about protecting an individual's
economic situation in relation to the government, all general taxes should
be subject to the same takings scrutiny as land use regulations. The law has
struggled with the relationship between taxes and takings, and so far, has
156. The law has consistently recognized that government may injure a person's financial
position, even in ways that substantially devalue private property, and that there is no legal remedy if
the injury is indirect. See, e.g., Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 509-10 (1923).
The Court stated that "for consequential loss or injury resulting from lawful governmental action, the
law affords no remedy," even if a regulation indirectly brings "great losses [to an owner] ... [or]
render[s] valuable property almost valueless." Id. at 510. Thus, if by building a new state highway the
government forces business owners on an alternative route to shut down because traffic is diverted, it
need not pay compensation, no matter how severe the financial loss. Accepting this cold-hearted truth,
one is left to wonder why the outcome should not be the same for those whose property is devalued
directly by a regulation.
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found no good way to explain it. 15 7 Why are general taxes not prima facie
takings of private property without compensation? The answer is not that
money is not property within the meaning of the Takings Clause. The
Court has decided cases to the contrary, 158 and in any case, this would be
illogical, for money is the currency with which government pays for
property interests under the Takings Clause. The Takings Clause would be
a pointless formality if the government could take a person's land by
eminent domain, compensate the owner, and then reclaim the money
without constitutional limitation. The Takings Clause must protect an
owner's bank account from government appropriation, as well as an
owner's tangible property. Nor can the answer be that tax obligations offer
owners a choice of how to satisfy the debt, and so are not targeted as
specific assets. 159 If, instead of condemning Blackacre, the government
demands either a deed to Blackacre or the value of Blackacre in cash
(which, of course, the government could later use to acquire Blackacre by
eminent domain), the effect is substantively no different than condemning
Blackacre directly. Property taxes take essentially this form for the failure
to pay taxes on Blackacre will eventually allow the government to acquire
title in lieu of the debt.
If there is a meaningful distinction for Fifth Amendment purposes
between general taxes and eminent domain takings, it must be in how taxes
are imposed in society compared to how government takes land. Taxes are
generally imposed on a broad population according to a consistent formula,
whereas eminent domain actions target specific owners to bear unique
burdens. When government requires an individual to give up ten square
feet of land for public use, it is neither the degree of the burden nor the
special nature of land that makes this burden unfair without compensation;
rather, it is that the government singled out the individual to bear a burden
157.
While there is a wealth of literature on the relationship between the police power to regulate
and takings, surprisingly little scholarship exists on the relationship between the power to tax and
takings, which presents many of the same conceptual problems. Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky have noted that "the taxing power remains the neglected corner of the takings triangle."
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277, 314 (2001). And
yet, as Saul Levmore has indicated, a theory of takings law is incomplete if it cannot explain "why the
power to tax-without compensation, of course-is not fundamentally inconsistent with the
constitutional obligation to compensate condemnees."
Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 292 (1990).

Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just

158. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169, 172 (1998) (holding that money
and interest accrued thereon was property within the meaning of the Takings Clause).
159. Justice Kennedy's rationale in his concurring opinion in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel seems
to support such a distinction between taxes and takings. See 524 U.S. 498, 541-44 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). He states that an act is not a taking if it "neither targets a specific property interest nor
depends upon any particular property for the operation of its statutory mechanisms." Id. at 543.
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that is not shared by the general public, but that exists for its benefit. There
is no unfairness, however, if the owner is given compensation from general
tax revenues for the ten acres so that taxpayers are made to share in the
expense of the project equally. The problem of eminent domain is
essentially one of discriminatory taxation, which the government corrects
through the provision of just compensation.
The relationship between taxes and takings underscores the contention
that a landowner's right to use can be defined neither in absolute terms nor
as a balancing test between the individual and government if it is to be
reconciled with the Takings Clause principle. This does not mean,
however, that a principled regulatory takings doctrine is impossible. It only
means that we need a more accurate conception of private property-one
that includes an element of comparative justice.
III. PROPERTY AS A COMPARATIVE RIGHT
Early writers on the law of just compensation confirm that it was
designed to serve an antidiscrimination purpose. Well before our Fifth
Amendment existed, Samuel Pufendorf relied on the natural law principle
of equality to explain the requirement that government compensate owners
for takings of private property.16 0 In discussing the issues of taxation and
eminent domain, Pufendorf explained that it is fair for a sovereign to
appropriate the property of citizens for the benefit of society, but only on
the condition that each citizen's contribution is fairly allocated in relation
to that of others.' 6 ' With respect to taxes, equality is achieved through
quotas; 162 with respect to eminent domain, equality is achieved through
compensation:
160.

See 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 1285 (C.H.

Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934). Other early writers, including Hugo Grotius and Blackstone,
comment that the law ofjust compensation arises from principles of natural law. See 3 HUGOGROTIUS,
THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 385, 807 (F. Kelsey trans., 1925); BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 138-

39. Pufendorf's explanation, however, is more complete than the others in that he describes how it
would offend natural equity for the government to take an individual's property for the good of the
public, without compensating for the loss. See PUFENDORF, supra, at 1285-86. He goes on to explain

how the provision of compensation corrects this inequity. See id.
161. See id. Relying on the work of Thomas Hobbes, Pufendorf discusses the follies of imposing
taxes and other legal burdens unequally on society, such as the resentment such a disparity would likely
foster in some of society's members. See id. at 1282-84. As he explains, "any burden which lies
lightly upon all, will be irksome to the rest if many evade it, and, indeed, intolerable. For as a rule, out
of grief at the injury, or from envy of others, men complain not so much of the burden itself, as of the
inequality .... " Id. at 1283.
162. See id. at 1283-85.
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Natural equity is observed, if, when some contribution must be made to
preserve a common thing by such as participate in its benefits, each of
them contributes only his own share, and no one bears a greater burden
than another. And the same is true in states. But since there are times in
the life of every state when a great necessity does not allow the
collection of strict quotas from every one, or when something belonging
to one or a few citizens is required for the necessary uses of the
commonwealth, the supreme sovereignty will be able to seize that thing
for the necessities of the state, on condition, however, that whatever
exceeds the
just share of its owners must be refunded them by the other
63
citizens.1
Early Supreme Court cases also relate the law of just compensation to
the ideal of equality. In 1893, Justice David Brewer, writing for the Court
stated that the Takings Clause
prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just
share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to
the public something more and different from that which is exacted from
other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned
to him. 164
The following year, in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 165 the Court
linked the law of just compensation to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, holding that "[t]he equal protection of the laws...
forbids legislation, in whatever form it may be enacted, by which the
property of one individual is, without compensation, wrested from him for
the benefit of another, or of the public."' 166 Even in Mahon, Justice Holmes
distinguished laws that secure an "average reciprocity of advantage," which
are valid without compensation, from regulatory actions requiring
compensation. 167 The reciprocity of advantage concept suggests that the
regulatory takings doctrine is focused on discriminatory governmental
action.
Laws of sufficient general applicability do not require
compensation because the legal burdens are shared among a community of
landowners for their collective benefit.
163. Id. at 1285. Like Pufendorf, James Madison also relates the problems of discriminatory and
arbitrary taxation to the protection of private property through the law of just compensation. See
Madison, supra note 44, at 267 ("A just security to property is not afforded by that government, under
which unequal taxes oppress one species of property and reward another species ....
164. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
165.
154 U.S. 362 (1894).
166. /d. at 399.
167. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)
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The ideal of equality among those who contribute to the government
represents the most persuasive justification for the constitutional rule that
government (that is, general taxpayers) must compensate individuals whose
property is taken by eminent domain. It is, therefore, remarkable that
modern law places so little weight on the extent to which a regulation
discriminates among property owners in determining what is a regulatory
taking. To be sure, the Court continues to say that the regulatory takings
doctrine is designed "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."'1 68 But in practice, the operative part of this statement
has not been "some people alone," as equality theory would suggest, but
rather the more flexible words "fairness and justice,"' 69 which courts
usually understand as implying a substantive balancing test.
Suppose we reconceive the regulatory takings doctrine as a
comparative right. Rather than define a regulatory taking in relation to the
owner's expectations or the remaining value (or use) of his or her property,
the antidiscrimination interpretation of the Takings Clause suggests that we
recognize regulatory takings in relation to how the government regulates
other owners. On the surface, there are several advantages to such an
approach. A comparative takings doctrine would avoid the troubling
denominator problem 17 ° because it does not require a determination of
whether all viable uses of the property in question have been destroyed,
thereby obviating the question of what parcel of land should be examined
in making that determination. It would also avoid the public interest
problem,' 71 which like the denominator problem, serves to confuse and
undermine the integrity of regulatory takings law. Importantly, a
comparative approach would explain the relationship between taxes and
takings, providing a consistent theoretical framework for determining
whether government action requires compensation, irrespective of whether
the government relies on its power to tax, its power of eminent domain, or
its police power. Moreover, a comparative takings doctrine would allow
government the flexibility to legislate in response to new circumstances
and new perceptions of harm without requiring compensation to owners (as
long as these new regulations are sufficiently general in application), but it
also would not eliminate the regulatory takings doctrine. Furthermore, a
168. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
169. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,Inc., 535 U.S. at 321.
170. See supra Part lI.B.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 150-55.
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comparative approach would bring the regulatory takings doctrine into
alignment with the underlying purpose of the Takings Clause.
There are, however, reasons to be skeptical about a comparative
regulatory takings doctrine. Is such a doctrine consistent with established
concepts of private property? Textualists will point out that the Takings
Clause does not use the word "equality," but the words "private property,"
and it is the text of the Constitution, not the underlying purposes, that
courts are authorized to enforce. 17 2 If a comparative regulatory takings
doctrine is valid, therefore, it must stem from a comparative concept of
private property. This premise presents a potential problem because we are
accustomed to thinking of private property in individualistic terms.
Edmund Burke once said that "Itihe characteristic essence of property...
is to be unequal."'173 One might suppose that if it is a taking of private
property for the government to tell one owner that he or she cannot do X on
his or her land, it would only multiply the taking if the government were to
tell every owner they may not do X. We should not excuse the government
74
because it has plundered multiple landowners instead of only one. 1
This analysis supposes that an owner's right to use land consists of a
series of simple on/off propositions. Either landowners have a property
right to engage in X or they do not. The extent of their usage rights does
not depend on how other members of the community are regulated. This
on/off conception of property is unnecessarily limited and is unworkable in
the context of regulatory takings. Moreover, background principles of
private property do not require such a conception of property usage rights;
in fact, history strengthens the case for a comparative concept of private
property rights.
172.

See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 37-41 (1997)

(arguing that the

people enacted the text of the Constitution and not the purposes that gave rise to it, and that therefore,
the intent of the framers is not authoritative).
173. 3 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT
HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 298 (rev. ed. 1865).
174. The Court makes a similar point in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. See 505 U.S.
1003, 1027 n.14 (1992). Recognizing that general criminal prohibitions might be immune from takings
scrutiny because of their generality, the Court nonetheless said that "a regulation specifically directed to
land use no more acquires immunity by plundering landowners generally than does a law specifically
directed at religious practice acquire immunity by prohibiting all religions." Id. The alternative
approach, the Court said, "renders the Takings Clause little more than a particularized restatement of
the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
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A. BLACKSTONE AND LAWS OF THE LAND

Take, for example, Blackstone's description of private property, which
supports a comparative theory of property: "The third absolute right,
inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists in the free
without any control or
use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions,
75
land."'
the
of
laws
the
by
only
save
diminution,
Two ideas appear in Blackstone's statement. First, private property
includes an affirmative right to use one's acquisitions; it does not consist
solely of a right to exclude others from possessing a thing. This is
consistent with our modern recognition that a restriction on the use of
property assets may amount to a taking of property rights. Second, and
equally important, an owner's right to use is inherently bound by the "laws
of the land." Even in Blackstone's view, no property owner has a right to
ignore laws of the land or to be compensated for their existence. If a law of
the land provides that owners may not do X, government need not
compensate owners for the restriction.
The key to Blackstone's conception of private property, as it relates to
regulatory takings, is in the meaning of laws of the land. Restrictions
imposed by laws of the land are beyond the scope of private property rights
and do not require compensation. Restrictions that are not laws of the land,
however, deny an owner's right to use and must be purchased from him or
her by the government. Importantly, Blackstone and his contemporaries
did not understand laws of the land as referring to all legislative
enactments. The concept does not even encompass all enactments that are
procedurally sound and substantively in the public interest. 176 One
essential characteristic of a law of the land is that it must be a rule of
As Blackstone explained in his definition of
general applicability.
municipal law:
[F]irst, [law] is a rule: not a transient, sudden order from a superior to or
concerning a particular person; but something... uniformi[] and
universal. Therefore, a particular act of the legislature to confiscate the
goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treason, does not enter into the
175.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, § 191, at 239 (internal citation omitted).
176. The idea of "law of the land" as a limitation on government power is historically closely
related to the "due process of law" requirement originating in the Magna Carta. As with due process,
the law-of-the-land requirement was understood to include both procedural and substantive
components. See RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL
TREATISE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOLLOWED BY COURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
CONCEPT OF THE "LAW OFTHE LAND" §§ 26-30, at 71-86 (1926).
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idea of a municipal law: for the operation of this act is spent upon Titius
77
only, and has no relation to the community in general ....

Daniel Webster, in his famous argument in Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, made the same point. 178
Discussing the
law-of-the-land limitation on private property under the New Hampshire
Bill of Rights, Webster said:
By the law of the land, is most clearly intended, the general law ....
Everything which may pass under the form of an enactment, is not,
therefore, to be considered the law of the land. If this were so, acts of
attainder, bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing

judgments, and acts directly transferring one man's estate to another,
legislative judgments, decrees and forfeitures, in all possible forms,
would be the law of the land. Such a strange construction would render
constitutional provisions, of the highest importance, completely
79
inoperative and void. 1

Many antebellum state courts interpreted law-of-the-land clauses in
state constitutions as prohibiting unequal legislation. As one court stated,
the "'law of the land' means a general public law, equally binding upon
every member of the community."' 80 Law-of-the-land cases in the early
nineteenth century, in fact, paved the way for what later became our equal
protection doctrine following the enactment of the Fourteenth
8
Amendment. ' '
177. BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, § 44, at 70.
178.
17 U.S. 518 (1819).
179. Id. at 581-82. Webster further quotes Edmund Burke in a passage that foreshadowed one of
the problems of ad hoc land use regulation:
"Is that the law of the land," said Mr. Burke, "upon which, if a man go to Westminster Hall,
and ask counsel by what title or tenure he holds his privilege or estate, according to the law of
the land, he should be told, that the law of the land is not yet known; that no decision or
decree has been made in his case; that when a decree shall be passed, he will then know what
the law of the land is? Will this be said to be the law of the land, by any lawyer who has a rag
of a gown left upon his back, or a wig with one tie upon his head?"
Id. at 582.
180. Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. 554, 555 (1831). See Regents of the Univ. of Md. v.
Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 412 (Md. 1838) ("An act which only affects and exhausts itself upon a
particular person, or his rights and privileges, and has no relation to the community in general [is not
the] ....law of the land."); Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, 254 (1858) ("By 'the law of the land' we
understand laws that are general in their operation, and that affect the rights of all alike ....
");
Janes v.
Reynolds' Adm'rs, 2 Tex. 250, 251-52 (1847) (stating that laws of the land are "general public laws,
binding on all the members of the community under similar circumstances"); Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene
15, 22-23 (Iowa 1849) (stating that acts of the legislature that operate on a discrete group of individual
do not amount to "laws of the land" because they have "no relation to the community in general"). For
a more detailed explanation of this history, see MOTT, supra note 176, §§ 26-30, at 71-86.
181. See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness,96 MICH.
L. REV. 245, 257-64 & n.58 (1997).
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Blackstone's definition of property, therefore, leads towards a
comparative understanding of that right, at least in the context of land use
If property ownership includes the right to use one's
regulation.
acquisitions within the bounds imposed by laws of the land, as Blackstone
tells us, and if laws of the land include only general laws, then it follows
that when government imposes a restriction that applies to only one owner
for the benefit of the larger community, it denies a portion of that owner's
property. But if government imposes the same restriction on all members
of the community, thereby making the restraint part of the law of the land,
then paradoxically, the government would not be taking property from
anyone.
B. THE HARM/BENEFIT BOUNDARY
One may arrive at the same conclusion under the historical "no harm"
conception of property usage rights. The Supreme Court has often upheld
statutes restricting certain uses of land on the grounds that the conduct in
question was deemed harmful to others, and that no property owner has an
inherent right to use his or her property in a manner that injures a
neighbor.1 82 The no-harm boundary of private property is exemplified by
the leading case of Mugler v. Kansas, in which the Court upheld a state
prohibition on liquor manufacture as applied to a previously lawful
distillery. 183 The Court held that an owner is not entitled to compensation
for laws proscribing conduct harmful to the health, safety, and morals of
society because all private property "is held under the implied obligation
1 84
that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."
Although the no-harm principle has deep historical roots, many,
including the Supreme Court, have expressed skepticism over whether it is
a useful concept to distinguish between those regulations that require
182. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987)
(allowing a restriction on mining coal in such a way as to cause subsidence); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272, 282-84 (1928) (allowing a regulation that prohibited planting trees to prevent the spread of
disease); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410-14 (1915) (holding that a land use restriction on
making bricks was valid as a legitimate exercise of police power to protect the health, safety, and peace
in an urban area); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667-68 (1878) (stating that it is a
"fundamental principle that everyone shall so use his own [property] as not to wrong and injure
another," and on this rationale, upholding a land use regulation that effectively shut down a plant that
manufactured chemical products from animal matter).
183. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 674-75 (1887).
184. Id. at 665 (internal citations omitted). See Fertilizing Co., 97 U.S. at 668 ("Every right, from
absolute ownership in property down to a mere easement, is purchased and holden subject to the
restriction that it shall be so exercised as not to injure others.") (quoting Coates v. Mayor of New York,
7 Cow. 585, 605 (N.Y. 1827)).
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compensation and those that do not.' 85 The problem lies in Ronald Coase' s
insight that the difference between a law that prevents harm and a law that
extracts a benefit depends on whose perspective one adopts. 186 For
example, one can describe a historic preservation ordinance as preventing
harm to society by assuming that the public has a vested interest in the
preservation of historic buildings, or as extracting a benefit from society by
assuming that landowners have a vested right to remove existing structures
from their land. Rather than clarify an owner's usage rights, the no-harm
standard seems only to beg the question of what a property owner is
entitled to do.
The modern criticism of the no-harm standard, however, is overstated.
While it is conceptually possible to describe any law as either
harm-preventing or benefit-conferring, doing so ignores normal societal
judgments of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. As one writer has
noted, "'[d]own' does not become 'up' just because one can invert oneself
on a trapeze."' 87 In any given society, there are certain shared assumptions
about accepted behavior that give meaning to the concept of harm. 188 In a
typical residential community, polluting the air with noxious gas would be
considered injurious to the neighbors, whereas building a house on an
empty lot similar to those that exist nearby would not be considered an
injurious use, even if the neighbors would prefer to see open space. The
harm/benefit concept is not meaningless, but it does need to be fleshed out.
William Fischel offers one possible clarification of the harm/benefit
standard. He proposes to define harmful conduct in relation to community
norms.1 89 According to Fischel, when government prohibits a landowner
from engaging in conduct that is outside the scope of normal behavior, it
need not compensate for the restriction. 190 When government prohibits an
owner from engaging in normal behavior, however, it must pay for the
extraction. 19 1 Fischel's theory of regulatory takings has some clear
185. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992); TRIBE, supra note 84,
§ 1 -5,
at 781-84; Rubenfeld, supra note 26, at 1137-38; Michelman, supra note 106, at 1626-29.
186.
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1,34-35 (1960) (explaining the
reciprocal nature of harms).
187.
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 354

(1995).
188. Andrea L. Peterson makes this point convincingly in defending the no-harm boundary. See
Underlying Principles, supra note 84, at 91 (arguing that Coase's notion of reciprocal harm is
"inconsistent with ordinary perceptions [of harm in] the world").
189.

See FISCHEL, supra note 187, at 353-55.

190.
191.

See id.
See id. at 351-53.

Fischel's theory is based on the work of Robert C. Ellickson, who

suggested that prohibitions on "normal behavior" provide a baseline by which to identify takings. See
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advantages. Unlike many takings formulas, the normal behavior standard
successfully reconciles the regulatory takings doctrine with a consistent
definition of property: A landowner has an inherent property right to use
land in accordance with community norms-nothing more or less. The
normal behavior standard is also flexible enough to recognize variations in
social definitions of harm over time and across different communities while
preserving the core function of the Takings Clause, which requires
compensation when an owner is asked to give up something that other
members of the community are not.
The primary weakness of Fischel's proposal, however, is that it seems
to give the ultimate responsibility to decide what is normal community
behavior to the wrong branch of government. Fischel would have courts
scrutinize legislative regulations affecting land use to determine if those
192
regulations are consistent with public perceptions of normal conduct.
This approach seems to have it backwards because the legislative branch is
in a better position (practically and constitutionally) to represent public
conceptions of harm and to voice those attitudes by enacting general
laws. 193 If, as in Mugler, a state legislature concludes that liquor
manufacture is harmful to public welfare and prohibits it, it would be
inappropriate for a court to override the legislature's conclusion on grounds
that liquor manufacture was previously legal and considered normal.
Mugler correctly holds that the legislature has the primary authority to
declare what conduct is harmful to a community. 194 In other words, what
was once normal behavior may suddenly become a violation of community
norms if and when the legislature decides to change those norms by
statute.19 5 Once we recognize this ability of the legislature, however, it is
Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines As Land Use

Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 729 (1973).
192. See FISCHEL, supra note 187, at 354-55. Fischel would give greater deference to larger
republics (states and the federal government) than to smaller local governments in determining what is
normal behavior, but would still give the courts the ultimate power to determine if the legislature
correctly implemented public attitudes of normalcy. See id.
193. Even more ironically, Fischel's approach would involve federal courts overruling state and
local decisions merely on the basis of what the public considers to be normal behavior.
194. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (declaring that "[u]nder our system[,] that
power is lodged with the legislative branch of government").
195. Even the conservative Thomas Cooley agreed. Discussing the law of the land, Cooley noted
the harsh reality that through legislative action,
the merchant of yesterday becomes the criminal of today, and the very building in which he

lives and conducts the business which to that moment was lawful becomes perhaps a
nuisance, if the statute shall so declare .... [Such a determination] must be justified upon the
highest reasons of public benefit ... [and] rest exclusively in the legislative wisdom.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 584 (1868).
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easy to suppose that there is no role for a no-harm or normal-behavior
limitation on property use, for if that were the case, every regulation would
become its own justification.
This problem in the normal-behavior standard is remedied if one looks
to the general laws of a community to determine what is normal, instead of
public attitudes and practices. Such an approach does not eliminate the
regulatory takings doctrine, but recognizes the legislature's primary
constitutional authority to define community norms by statute or
regulation, and even to change those norms over time if the public interest
requires it.
In upholding the Kansas legislature's finding that
manufacturing liquor was injurious to society, the Mugler Court
emphasized throughout its opinion that the legislature had prohibited such
conduct generally, and had not singled out the plaintiff.' 9 6 The Court's
rationale is illuminating:
Nor can it be said that government interferes with or impairs any one's
constitutional rights of liberty or of property, when it determines that
[certain conduct is] ... hurtful to society, and constitute[s], therefore, a
business in which no one may lawtfully engage. Those rights are best
secured.., by the observance, upon the part of all, of such regulations
as are established by competent authority to promote the common good.
No one may rightfully do that which the law-making power, upon
197
reasonable grounds, declares to be prejudicial to the general welfare.
Mugler suggests that generally applicable laws and regulations define
normal behavior in a society, and accordingly, their application does not
require compensation to landowners. By the same reasoning, regulations
that single out one or a few owners for restrictions not shared by others in
the community deprive those owners of their right to use in accordance
with normal land use practices, and are valid only if the affected owners are
compensated. This was, in fact, the Supreme Court's holding in Yates v.
Milwaukee, 198 a case rarely thought of today, but which ought to be
considered the counterpart to Mugler in the history of the regulatory
takings doctrine. In Yates, the Court invalidated a Milwaukee ordinance
declaring a riparian owner's wharf to be a nuisance and ordering it
196. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662-63.
197. Id. (emphasis added). "Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of
his property for lawful purposes ... but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for
certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests." Id. at 669 (emphasis added). "[Wie
do not doubt [the state's] power to declare that any place, kept and maintained for the illegal
manufacture and sale of such liquors, shall be deemed a common nuisance, and be abated.
Id. at
671 (emphasis added).
198. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870).
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destroyed. Because there were no general laws prohibiting the wharf
(rather, the ordinance applied only to one owner), the City could not rely on
harm prevention to justify its action.' 99 The City's ordinance was
effectively a taking of property for public use without compensation.2 °° As
Justice Samuel Miller explained for the Court:
It is a doctrine not to be tolerated in this country, that a municipal
corporation, without any general laws either of the city or of the State,
within which a given structure can be shown to be a nuisance, can, by its
mere declaration that it is one, subject it to removal by any person
supposed to be aggrieved, or even by the city itself. This would place
every house, every business, and all the property20 1of the city, at the
uncontrolled will of the temporary local authorities.
The Court concluded that if Milwaukee authorities thought removal of the
owner's wharf would serve the public interest, "they must first make him
20 2
compensation for his property so taken for the public use."
Like Blackstone's definition of property, the no-harm principle of the
eighteenth century leads comfortably to a comparative concept of property
rights and to a comparative regulatory takings doctrine. To hold that a
regulation is a taking of private property when it singles out one owner for
a restraint not shared by others is certainly within the range of reasonable
textual interpretation. Considering that early writers and cases declare that
property rights exist relative to the general laws of society, and that the
Fifth Amendment exists to prevent government from imposing unequal
burdens, this may be the most faithful interpretation of the Takings Clause.
IV. COMPARATIVE TAKINGS DOCTRINE IN APPLICATION
Even if there are logical and historical reasons to interpret the Fifth
Amendment as requiring compensation when the government treats
property owners unequally, it remains to be seen whether a takings
standard based on the ideal of equality is workable in application. If such a
theory would sweep too broadly or too narrowly, it will likely remain in the
dustbin of regulatory takings law.
A reasonable comparative takings doctrine is possible if one
recognizes two important distinctions. First, takings law must distinguish
between formal equality and substantive equality, and recognize that the
199.
200.
201.
202.

See id. at 505.
See id. at 505-06.
Id.
at 505.
Id. at 507.
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Fifth Amendment only requires formal equality among property owners.
Second, takings law must distinguish between regulations that are
sufficiently general in application, so as not to require compensation, and
those that target a few owners for the benefit of a larger class. From this
distinction, it follows that although a regulation may not apply to all
owners in a jurisdiction, it is not a taking if it applies to a broad community
of owners and is reasonably designed for the overall benefit of that
community.
A. FORMAL EQUALITY V. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
One potential problem raised by interpreting the Takings Clause as an
equality rule is the expense of achieving equality in practice. Nearly all
laws disadvantage some citizens relative to others. If the Takings Clause
were interpreted to require that the substantive effects of a regulation be
equal, or even close to equal, for all affected property owners, it would
work a dramatic change in constitutional law. A substantive equality
requirement has radical implications, such as Epstein's suggestion that all
regulations must be Pareto-optimal for all regulated owners.2 °3 For this
reason, the Supreme Court consistently declines to adopt such a
requirement in takings cases, and rightly so.20 4 As Justice Brennan
explained in Penn Central, "[l]egislation designed to promote the general
20 5
welfare commonly burdens some more than others."
This observation does not refute a comparative regulatory takings
doctrine, however, for there are different measures of equality. A standard
based on substantive equality (or equality of outcome) would measure a
law's actual economic effect on owners, including its effect on individual
property values and each owner's business practices. By contrast, a
standard of formal equality (or legal equality) would simply ask whether a
regulation on its face applies to a broad community of owners. 206 A law
that is general in application satisfies the requirement of formal equality,
although it may significantly disadvantage some owners relative to others.
A plausible comparative takings doctrine must be based on a baseline
of formal equality. Neither Blackstone's concept of law of the land nor the
203.
204.
205.
206.
and the

See TAKINGS, supra note 59, at 199-202.

See supra text accompanying notes 66-73.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978).
For discussions of substantive and formal equality, see Robin West, The Meaning of Equality
Interpretive Turn, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451, 469-70 (1990), and Michel Rosenfeld,

Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1687,

1696-98 (1986).
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Mugler concept of the police power require more than that a law be
generally applicable.
Formal equality is a familiar baseline in
constitutional law. It is the standard that governs the equal protection
doctrine,2 °7 the free exercise doctrine,2 °8 and other comparative
constitutional rights. 20 9 History and reason suggest that the Takings Clause
was designed to remedy government actions that formally discriminate
among property owners with respect to their rights, rather than government
actions that merely impact, in different ways, owners who are subject to the
same legal restrictions.
By recognizing that the Takings Clause requires no more than formal
equality, we see that many typical land use regulations that are highly
burdensome to one class of owners (and may even be designed to put some
owners out of business) do not require compensation. Consider the
following examples.
Statutory Nuisance Restrictions. A county enacts an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of large hog farms. There is only one large hog
farm that happens to operate in the county. Even if the ordinance were
enacted with the idea of closing that particular farm, compensation should
not be required as long as other owners in the county share in the legal
restriction against operating large hog farms.
Air Emission Standards. A state lowers its air emission standard for
stationary sources pursuant to the Clean Air Act. 2 10 There is only one
factory in the state whose emissions are realistically affected by the change.
The state does not owe compensation to the factory owner as long as other
207. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that disparate impact on a
protected class does not, in itself, render a law violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
208. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-80 (1990) (holding
that generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if they substantially burden
a person's religious practice).
209. Other constitutional provisions that require formal equality, at least in certain contexts,
include the Establishment Clause, see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-59 (2002)
(finding an educational voucher program constitutional, despite the fact that the majority of voucher
recipients used them to attend religious schools, because the program was facially neutral with respect

to religion), the Free Speech Clause, see Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 94-96 (1972) (holding
that regulations of speech that discriminated on the basis of content were unconstitutional), and even the
Search and Seizure Clause, see Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-53 (1990)
(finding suspicionless sobriety checks constitutional if imposed on all drivers at established
checkpoints).
210. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-76 7 1q (2001).
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landowners are also restrained from engaging in land uses that would
exceed the emissions standard.2 1 1
Rent Controls. A city enacts rent controls applicable to residential
leases.
The ordinance prohibits rent increases beyond a specified
percentage of the current rent per year. It also prohibits the creation of new
leases at rents that are unreasonable in relation to comparable residences in
the community. The ordinance does not prevent landlords from taking
property off the rental market upon termination of existing leases.
Although the ordinance clearly disadvantages current landlords relative to
other members of the community, it is not a taking because it prohibits all
owners (current landlords, future landlords, and even those who are not
allowed to use their land for rental income) from using their land to charge
rents above the rate at which the law determined is reasonable.21 2
As in each of these examples, determining whether a law prohibiting
owners from engaging in a particular conduct (X) on private land is a
taking, requires consideration of the entire class of owners who are legally
prohibited from doing X. It would be a mistake to limit the inquiry to those
owners who are currently engaged in doing X, or who would like to do X,
and ask whether those owners are disadvantaged as a group. For formal
equality purposes, the relevant class of regulated owners includes those
who are unlikely ever to engage in the prohibited conduct, and even those
who are subject to more restrictive regulations that encompass the
2 13
prohibition of doing X.
211. The standards for new stationary sources of pollution, if anything, are likely to be more
stringent pursuant to the Clean Air Act's requirements. Existing factory owners, therefore, may not
complain that they are required to operate their land under a restriction that the general community is
permitted to ignore. Although the remaining landowners may be restrained by more stringent emission
standards, they also would not have a valid takings claim if the new source emission standards are
sufficiently general, even if the new standards did not apply to other owners. For a discussion of
variances, see infra text accompanying notes 223-32.
212. This reasoning is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Yee v. City of Escondido.
503 U.S. 519, 527-28 (1992) (holding that a rent control ordinance is not a taking, as long as an owner
is not required to maintain his or her land as rental property). It would present a different case,
however, if the ordinance prohibited current landlords from converting their property to nonrental
property, thereby requiring landlords to have tenants at below market rates in perpetuity. A regulation
of this sort would formally discriminate between current landlords, who would have no choice but to
leave the rental business and engage in other land uses, and landowners who could continue to make
nonrental use of their land.
213. For example, a city ordinance prohibiting one owner from operating a large hog farm would
not be a taking-even if the restriction applied to only one landowner-if the rest of the city were
subject to a more inclusive regulation, such as a total ban on hog farming. Although the city's action
effectively creates more than one legislative classification, it may still be said that the prohibition on
large hog farms is not a taking of private property because it is shared by owners throughout the city.
Likewise, in considering whether a rent control ordinance is a taking, one must include in the relevant
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The ideal of formal equality clarifies why the court in Mugler v.
Kansas correctly held that it was not a taking of private property for the
Kansas legislature to prohibit liquor manufacture in the state, even though
only a minority of landowners were interested in engaging in this land
use. 2 14 The Court stressed the point that, in terms of formal law, the legal
burden was imposed equally on all owners in the State. 2 15 By contrast, if
the Kansas legislature had chosen to prohibit liquor manufacture on only
one owner's land, compensation would have been appropriate, even if the
legislature had rational reasons for imposing the restriction solely on that
location. It would have been a taking of the owner's right to use land in
accordance with general community standards.
Being that the Fifth Amendment allows severe disparate impacts on
different landowners, one might legitimately ask why it should require
formal equality. First, the ideal of formal equality is rooted in our
traditions; it governs the implementation of other constitutional provisions,
such as the Equal Protection Clause. Our society has long recognized that
a law is more just if it binds everyone in a society equally. 2 16 Thus, even in
situations where it would make little practical difference to formally extend
a restriction to owners who would never engage in the prohibited conduct,
a regulation is improved when it is imposed in a generally applicable
manner. Owners who are disappointed by a restriction are less likely to
feel that they have been treated unjustly if the law formally applies to
2 17
several other owners.
Second, a standard of formal equality is a powerful check on
majoritarian abuses of power. When government must either regulate land
use through generally applicable laws or pay compensation to those who
class those owners who are subject to a more restrictive regulation than the prohibition against
operating apartments at full market value, such as owners who are not even permitted to build or
operate apartments at all. Similarly, in measuring the constitutionality of an emission standard
applicable to certain factories, one must consider both owners who are subject to more stringent
emission standards and those who are prohibited from operating large factories on their land.
214. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662-63 (1887).
215. See id. at 662-63, 669, 671; supra note 197 and accompanying text.
216. Equality under the law is a fundamental tenet of classical liberal theory, as articulated by
Hobbes, Locke, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Jefferson, and
arises from the belief that because humans are equal in their capacity for moral reflection, they deserve
equal treatment under the law.
See CHRISTINE M. KOGGEL, PERSPECTIVES ON EQUALITY:
CONSTRUCTING A RELATIONAL THEORY 48-49 (1998). As Koggel explains: "Because it matters to us
that we have this freedom, we are forced logically to value the freedom of others because we realize
that they are like us in also having the requisite capacities and valuing their freedom to exercise these
capacities." Id. at 48. See also RAWLS, supra note 71, at 60 ("[E]ach person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.").
217. See PUFENDORF, supra note 160, at 1282-83.
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are singled out for more restrictive burdens, it is less likely to take
advantage of politically powerless minorities and more likely to act on the
basis of legitimate public values.2 8 When a community wishes to impose
a land use restriction that would be costly to some owners, the community
confirms that the law is based on legitimate public values when it is willing
to impose the same restriction on itself, or, in the alternative, provide
compensation to the affected owners.
Finally, a standard of formal equality is equitable. Some land use
restrictions are based on legitimate site-specific policy concerns, and
therefore should not apply to the broader community. In these situations,
compensation is necessary to maintain the principle that no individual
should be forced to contribute more than a fair share of the cost of
government. For example, a city may choose to prohibit the construction
of any permanent structure at a particular location near the ocean for the
purpose of preserving a valuable public view. The only way to phrase the
regulation in general terms would be to subject a large community of
owners to an absolute ban on permanent structures, which may not make
sense. A comparative takings doctrine, however, would require only that
compensation be provided to the owner who is singled out. Just as an
owner should be compensated if the government chooses to take an
easement across his or her land to access the beach,21 9 the same principle of
equity demands compensation if an owner's land use is uniquely restricted
for purposes of creating a public view. 220
B. How GENERAL MUST A REGULATION BE?

Under a formal equality standard, a land use restriction is a taking if it
applies to only one owner. Because that owner is forced to sacrifice
something unique for the public benefit, compensation from taxpayer funds
for the owner's loss is appropriate. We can also say that a restriction is not
a taking if it applies to all owners in a jurisdiction (general criminal and
218. See Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 172327 (1984). Sunstein explains that the Takings Clause, like many other constitutional provisions, is
designed to prevent government action based on interest group politics (what he calls "naked
preferences") and to encourage public deliberation of higher republican values. See id.
219. See Nollan v, Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) ("Had [the State]...
required ... an easement across their [property] available to the public on a permanent basis.., we
have no doubt there would have been a taking.").
220. John Rawls' theory of justice supports this result. As Rawls explains: "There is no more
justification for using the state apparatus to compel some citizens to pay for unwanted benefits that
others desire than there is to force them to reimburse others for their private expenses." RAWLS, supra
note 71, at 283.
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business laws, for example), even if the restraint leaves some owners worse
off than others.
Unfortunately these rules do not resolve most situations in land use
law. It remains to be seen how the law should analyze a regulation that
applies to a class of owners consisting of more than one, but less than all,
owners in a jurisdiction. How general must a regulation be to avoid the
requirement of compensating all aggrieved owners? While this question
presents a challenge for a comparative takings theory, it is a question with a
principled answer.
We can easily reject the extremes. It would make little sense to hold
that a law that applies to multiple owners can never be a taking. A
regulation that applies to several owners for the benefit of the larger
community can be just as inequitable as a regulation that applies to one
owner alone, and may therefore require compensation to satisfy the
demands of equity. It would, however, also be incorrect to require
compensation for every regulation that distinguishes among property
owners within a jurisdiction. It is the nature of modern zoning to impose
land use requirements that vary from one location to another, and there is
nothing inherently inequitable about this. Even the common law of
nuisance imposes differing land use standards depending on geographic
location.22 ' Unless we are to declare virtually all modern land use
regulation unconstitutional, we must reject a rule that would deem any
regulation that formally does not apply to all owners in a political
jurisdiction a taking.
An examination of the role of the just compensation requirement
reveals the proper balance between these extremes. The takings clause
requires only that the burden of government action imposed for the benefit
of a community be dispersed and shared by the members of that
community, rather than selectively borne by a few. Dispersion of a burden
is achieved when the regulation formally binds most of its beneficiaries
(even if some exemptions are granted), or when the government
compensates, through general revenues, those owners who are singled out.
The question in determining if there has been a regulatory taking, therefore,
ought to be whether a regulation is sufficiently broad in its application that
the owners who bear the regulatory burden also are the primary
beneficiaries.
221. As Justice George Sutherland stated in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., "[a] nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place[]-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." 272
U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
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To determine whether a regulation is sufficiently general, takings law
must therefore consider who the primary beneficiaries of a regulation are.
Most local land use restrictions are imposed for the benefit of the owners
who are subject to the restrictions. For example, in a typical cumulative
222
zoning scheme, the most restricted zone is the RI or single-family zone.
In such a zone, it is common to permit only single-family homes subject to
detailed height, frontage, and setback specifications. While it would be
accurate to say that owners in a residential zone are subject to land use
restrictions that are not imposed on owners in other zones, one cannot say
that they are unfairly burdened as a class. This is because the residential
restrictions exist for the benefit of landowners in that residentialzone. The
restrictions preserve property values for residential owners and maintain
the character of the community. In this sense, a residential zoning
classification is similar to a generally applicable law; it is imposed for the
collective benefit of those who are forced to abide by it.
A typical zoning classification, therefore, should not require
compensation even if some owners in the zone are harmed by the
classification. As usual, some regulated owners may find that it would be
more profitable to engage in uses that are prohibited by the zoning
classification, particularly those owners whose property is located at the
edge of a zone and who already suffer the adverse effects of uses in other
zones. 223 These owners, however, are in no less equitable a position than
those who are effectively disadvantaged by generally applicable state and
federal laws. 224 The risk that the government will enact new regulations to
222. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
CONTROL LAW 82 (1998).
223. Potential profit motivated the plaintiff in Euclid. In Euclid, the zoning classification
devalued the plaintiffs property by approximately seventy-five percent, or $7500 per acre. 272 U.S. at
384. The property was particularly well suited for industrial development, but was zoned for residential
use only. Id. Nevertheless, the Court found the zoning scheme to be a valid exercise of the police
power. Id. at 388-92.
224. One might compare the plight of landowners in Wendover, Utah, who have complained over
the years that they are hurt by Utah's prohibition on commercial gambling relative to their close Nevada
neighbors. For many years, the Utah side of Wendover has suffered economically, while the Nevada
side of Wendover has thrived due to its casino industry. Landowners in Wendover, Utah have sought
creatively for ways to relieve themselves of Utah's gambling restriction, including annexation by
Nevada, but so far they have not succeeded. See Michael Janofsky, Moving a Border to Wed Rich and
Poor Towns, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at Al. While the case of Wendover presents an interesting
political issue, one cannot reasonably claim that Utah has taken the property of landowners in
Wendover, even though they are subject to different rules than Nevada landowners. The fact remains
that Utah's restriction on gambling is imposed on Utah residents for the benefit of Utah residents. The
same dynamic is common to zoning. As long as a zoning restriction is reasonably imposed for the
benefit of those who are subject to it, the law is not a taking, even if it fails to benefit every owner
within that zone.
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the disadvantage of some property owners is always present in a
democracy. What is important for just compensation purposes is that those
owners have not been chosen to bear a special legal burden for the primary
benefit of those outside the legal classification, but rather, those owners are
regulated in the same manner as other owners for whose benefit the
restrictions are enacted.
By this reasoning, a zoning classification is not a taking even if the
government grants variances to some owners within a zone. The regulated
class of owners does not include those who are exempted. As long as
variances are such that the regulation still creates net advantages for the
class of owners who are subject to its restrictions, there is no equitable
reason to require compensation from public funds to all the regulated
landowners. Of course, too many variances may destroy the advantages of
a zoning classification and result in a taking of private property for the few
owners who are not given a variance. But variances that leave intact the
advantages of a regulated community should not turn a zoning
classification into a taking.
A balanced regulatory takings test, therefore, should ask whether a
property restriction is reasonably designed for the benefit of the community
of owners who are subject to the restriction. If a legislature reasonably
determines that a particular community is collectively better off by
imposing reciprocal restrictions on the members of that community,
compensation should not be required for those within the class who are
disadvantaged. If, however, a restriction on one group of owners only
makes sense because of its benefits to other nonregulated members of the
public, the restriction presents a classic case for compensation. One of the
most important factors affecting this inquiry will be the number of owners
who are formally subject to the regulation. The greater the number of
regulated owners, the more likely a regulation has the relevant
characteristics of a general police power regulation, that is, the more
plausible it will be to find that the regulation is designed for the collective
benefit of those who are subject to it. By contrast, the fewer the number of
regulated owners, especially where those owners are dispersed and the
effects of the regulation are severe, the more likely it is that the government
has imposed a special restriction on those owners for the primary benefit of
outsiders.
There is precedent for this inquiry in takings cases. We find it in the
concept of "average reciprocity of advantage," which Justice Holmes raised
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in Mahon.225 According to Holmes, a regulation is not a taking if it is
designed to create an average reciprocity of advantage among those who
are regulated.22 6 Holmes never fully defined the reciprocity of advantage
concept, and its usage has varied in more recent cases. 227 Reciprocity of
advantage does not mean that the precise benefits of a regulation must
228
outweigh the regulatory costs for every member of the regulated group.
Holmes did suggest, however, that a restriction on a select group of
owners' use of property is not a taking if the restriction is designed to
create a special benefit for the class of owners who are subject to its
restrictions. 229 The reciprocity concept in land use regulation arose from
the law of special assessments.23 ° It was the police power parallel to a
well-settled principle in tax law: Government may impose a special tax on
a discreet group of landowners for their own benefit (for financing a
specific project that will benefit those landowners particularly, for
225. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
226. See id. See also Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922) (holding that the police
power justified the imposition on the parties and that the imposition was not a taking).
227. See Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity of
Advantage" Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1489 (1997)
[hereinafter Role of "Harm/Benefit"]. Modern commentators disagree on the meaning of reciprocity of
advantage. See Thomas A. Hippler, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory Taking
Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use," "Average Reciprocity of Advantage," and "Bundle of
Rights" from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 653, 673 n.l 10
(1987) (citing interpretations of various commentators).
228. As Holmes explained in Jackman: "The exercise of [the police power] has been held
warranted in some cases by what we may call the average reciprocity of advantage, although the
advantages may not be equal in the particular case." 260 U.S. at 30.
229. See Role of "Harm/Benefit," supra note 227, at 1489-1505. Although Justice Holmes used
the phrase "reciprocity of advantage" in only two opinions, he cited precedent illustrating the principle
that a police power regulation creating a reciprocity of advantage is valid without compensation. See
id. (providing detailed explanation and interpretation of the two cases and the precedent on which they
relied). That precedent included cases upholding the following acts, regulations, and restrictions: (a) a
law requiring common drainage of a marshland within a defined tract at the expense of the owners; (b)
a law creating an irrigation district for improvement of lands and a law assessing the costs of irrigation
on landowners within the district; (c) an assessment against banks for the purpose of creating a fund to
secure the repayment of deposits in the event that a bank becomes insolvent; and (d) a mining safety
regulation designed to reduce flooding between adjoining mines. See id.
230. See Hippler, supra note 227, at 679 (explaining that Holmes' reciprocity of advantage insight
"was merely the principle of 'special benefit' taxing districts extended to analogous police power
exercises"). Several of the cases on which Holmes relied were, in fact, special assessment cases. See
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 113 (1911) (upholding an assessment on banks for the
purpose of creating a fund to secure repayment of deposits); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164
U.S. 112, 158 (1896) (upholding the creation of an irrigation district for the improvement of lands and
the assessment of costs on landowners within the district); Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606, 614
(1885) (upholding a statute requiring common drainage at the expense of the owners).
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example), but not for general revenue purposes. 231 Just as special taxes are
valid if they are imposed for the benefit of the group that is taxed, special
police power regulations are valid if they are imposed to create an average
reciprocity of advantage among the regulated owners.
In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has muddled the concept of
reciprocity of advantage. 232 It has sometimes applied the reciprocity
concept broadly, suggesting that a regulation is not a taking if it results in
benefits to society as a whole. As members of society, landowners are
benefited by reasonable regulations imposed on them and others, and they
therefore receive some reciprocity of advantage from all regulations. This
line of reasoning, if taken seriously, would unravel the entire regulatory
takings doctrine, and so it is no surprise that contemporary takings cases do
not consistently rely on reciprocity to determine whether a regulation
requires compensation.
A comparative regulatory takings doctrine would restore the
reciprocity of advantage concept to its meaningful origins. It would allow
the government to regulate a discrete group of landowners without
providing compensation, as long as the regulation is reasonably designed
for the special benefit of those landowners. It would, however, require
compensation whenever the government imposes a special regulation on a
select few for the general benefit of society. This test not only has the
231.
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 208 (1893) (holding that a railroad
company's exemption for taxation applied to ordinary taxes, not special assessments to pay the cost of
local improvements from which the company benefited); County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691,
703-04 (1880) (holding that special assessments may be imposed on a county that is specially benefited
by an improvement). In Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898), the Supreme Court directly applied
the Takings Clause to special assessments, holding that a special assessment imposed on a property
owner "in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to the extent of such excess, a
taking, under the guise of taxation, of private property for public use without compensation." Id. at
279. In later cases, the Supreme Court relaxed the Norwood requirement that every owner who is
assessed must receive a benefit in proportion to the assessment. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 433 (1905). But the principle still remains that special
assessments or special tax districts are valid only if they are used to fund projects that create special
benefits to the class of owners who are subject to the tax; otherwise, special assessments are an arbitrary
exercise of tax discrimination. For a recent application of this principle, see Olde Fla. Invs., Ltd. v. Port
of the Islands Cmty. Improvement Dist. (In re Port of the Islands Cmty. Improvement Dist.), 272 B.R.
779, 783-84 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).
232.
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987) (upholding
a state act prohibiting coal mining that caused subsidence damage to preexisting structures because of
its public benefits); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (holding that
the city's Landmarks Law did not effect a taking based in part on the fact that the restrictions imposed
were substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare). For a full analysis of the evolution
of the reciprocity of advantage concept in regulatory takings law, see Role of "Harm/Benefit," supra
note 227, at 1489-1520.
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advantage of supporting a moderate regulatory takings doctrine in a way
that is consistent with the text of the Fifth Amendment, it would make
judicial scrutiny of police power regulations consistent with principles of
taxation. Like special assessments and tax districts, a regulation that
applies to a discrete class of owners ought to receive judicial scrutiny to
ensure that it is reasonably imposed for the benefit of that group, and is not
a vehicle for extracting something from a minority of owners for the
benefit of the larger public. In effect, a comparative takings doctrine would
provide a single standard of fairness that can be used to judge all
government actions, whether exercised under the taxation power, police
power, or eminent domain power.
C. COMPARISON TO CURRENT TAKINGS STANDARDS AND FURTHER
APPLICATIONS
Although existing takings standards do not explicitly depend on the
generality of a regulation to determine whether compensation is required,
the outcomes produced by these standards are often consistent with those of
a comparative takings theory. Can it be that the ideal of equality has been
guiding the development of takings law all along? Remarkably, a
comparative theory of the Fifth Amendment seems to legitimate much of
current regulatory takings law.
1. Deprivation of All Beneficial Use: A New Perspective on the Lucas
Rule
The Supreme Court has held that a regulation denying an owner all
economically viable use of land is a prima facie taking of private
property.23 3 Thus, David Lucas suffered a taking of two undeveloped
parcels of land when South Carolina established a protective coastal zone
encompassing them and prohibited the building of any new residences in
that zone. The regulation effectively destroyed all economic value of
Lucas' land.234
Under a comparative takings doctrine, the outcome in Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council was correct. Moreover, we may say the same for
virtually
any
case
resolved
under
the
deprivation-of-all-economically-viable-use rule. Few landowners would
voluntarily choose to accept a ban on all economically viable use of their
own land in exchange for the placement of a similar restriction on others.
233.
234.

See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
See id. at 1009.
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Restrictions of such severity realistically only exist when the broader
community chooses to restrict a minority of owners for the benefit of the
broader community. David Lucas was selected to bear a restriction not
shared by most owners in South Carolina-a permanent prohibition on
having any structure capable of occupation on his land. This restriction
235
only applied to owners of undeveloped land within the protective zone.
Given the severity of this restraint, we can be confident that it was not
imposed for the reciprocal advantage of owners in Lucas' position, but was
for the benefit of the broader community at the expense of certain owners.
In one passage of the Lucas opinion, the Supreme Court recognized
the
for
a
basis
as
reciprocity
of
lack
the
deprivation-of-all-economically-viable-use rule. The Court said:
Surely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or
economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to
indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply "adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life[]" .. , in a manner that secures an
"average reciprocity of advantage" to everyone concerned .... 236
The Court probably did not intend for this to be the operative portion of its
Yet it is the most persuasive justification for the
opinion.
deprivation-of-all-economically-viable-use rule, and a comparative takings
theory shows that it works quite nicely. To be sure, a comparative takings
doctrine should, in theory, allow a community to permanently restrict
anyone from making economically viable use of private land for the
community's own reciprocal benefit, in which case the regulation should
not be considered a taking. But the possibility of a general ban on all
economically viable use is so remote that it need not be considered. In the
real world, where almost all landowners care about using their land for
some economically viable purpose, the Lucas rule works as an effective
proxy for determining if some owners have been singled out to sacrifice
property usage rights for the benefit of others.
235. The relevant classification should not change by characterizing the regulation as a ban on
"new" development, which one may say applies to all owners in the coastal zone, including those
whose homes are grandfathered by the regulation and those who benefit from it. By allowing existing
coastal zone homeowners to maintain their homes, while prohibiting owners of undeveloped land from
ever building homes on their land, the law creates more than a disparate impact; it legally creates two
classes of owners within the coastal zone who prospectively are subject to different land use
requirements based on whether their land had a permanent home on it before the regulation was
enacted. Because of this legal distinction, existing homeowners in the coastal zone should not be
grouped with owners of undeveloped land for purposes of determining if the regulation creates a
reciprocity of advantage.
236. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18.
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2. Partial Deprivations: An Alternative to Ad Hocery
Understanding the Lucas rule as a proxy for a comparative takings
doctrine also provides direction in resolving cases of partial deprivation.
Under current law, a regulation that partially deprives an owner of the
economic use of land could potentially be a taking, but outcomes are often
uncertain because an ad hoc balancing framework applies. A comparative
takings doctrine would provide a principled standard for resolving this
class of cases. Rather than decide whether compensation is required based
on the quantity of undivided property owned by the individual landowner
(using this as the denominator of the takings fraction), the degree of public
interest supporting the regulation, or the owner's subjective expectationsall of which should logically be irrelevant to whether a regulation has taken
the landowner's specific property 237 -a comparative takings doctrine
would ask whether the regulation is reasonably designed to benefit the class
of owners who are regulated. This inquiry would not always produce the
same outcomes as might be expected under the Penn Central standard, nor
should it. Given the appropriate deference to legislative judgments
however, a comparative takings standard should not radically change the
current balance between private and public interests. Consider these
potential applications:
Setback Restrictions. A comparative takings doctrine explains why
regulations affecting how close one may build to an abutting street
typically are not takings of private property. 238 Even though a setback
restriction may deprive an owner of all economically viable use of a strip of
land near the street, a typical setback restriction is imposed for the
combined benefit of the regulated class. Of course, a setback restriction
would result in a taking if it were designed for some purpose other than the
creation of local reciprocal advantages. An example would be a special
setback requirement applicable to owners on one street for the purpose of
facilitating the future widening of that road. Just as the actual widening of
the road over private land would be a taking of private property, a special
restriction on land use imposed solely for the purpose of saving the
government costs in future eminent domain proceedings (though this is a
239
legitimate public purpose) results in a partial taking of private property.
237. See supra Part II.B.2.
238. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (upholding the constitutionality of setback
restrictions).
239. See Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1990) (holding that
compensation was required for a restriction designed solely to preserve property values in places where
future highways were planned). Restrictions imposed for a mixture of reasons present a more difficult
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Wetlands. Partial deprivations that are relatively severe in their effects
and uneven in their application, such as restrictions on development in
designated wetland areas, are more likely to result in takings of private
property. 240 In the case of wetland regulation, a comparative takings
doctrine would ask whether restrictions on filling wetlands work to the
reciprocal advantage of wetland owners as a group. While it is unclear
whether this can be shown, federal and state regulators should be allowed
to make their case on this point, and courts should give appropriate
deference to reasonable legislative judgments. If a court finds that wetland
restrictions do not reasonably create net benefits for wetland owners as a
group, but make policy sense only by weighing the benefits to society as a
whole, it is appropriate that restricted owners should be compensated for
their sacrifice. While there are strong policy reasons favoring wetland
regulation, there is no good reason for refusing to compensate owners
whose property rights are specially diminished for the benefit of the
broader public.
Land Use Moratoria. Comparative takings doctrine also provides a
useful standard for determining whether a temporary restriction on new
development is a taking of private property. In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, the Supreme Court held

that land use moratoria should not be analyzed under the categorical
The decision is
deprivation-of-all-economically-viable-use rule.2 4 1
consistent with a comparative takings doctrine. As the Court recognized,
unlike permanent deprivations, moratoria often work to the average benefit
of those who are regulated: They may serve to maintain the long-term
planning goals of the community and allow time for regulators to make
reasonable planning decisions for the average benefit of all. 242 But not all
moratoria are designed to create an average reciprocity of advantage among
those who have no present use for their land. The longer the duration of
factual case. Cf Palm Beach County v. Wright, 641 So. 2d 50, 53-54 (Fla. 1994) (finding that
compensation was not required where restrictions on areas designated for future streets were imposed as
part of comprehensive a plan). A comparative takings doctrine, however, would at least supply courts
with the right question to ask in determining whether compensation is due.
240. Wetlands cases have produced mixed results under the regulatory takings doctrine, often
depending on the application of the denominator issue. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
632 (2001) (remanding for determination under the Penn Central test as to whether the wetlands
restrictions amounted to a taking). Compare Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 136467 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming that the denial of a permit under the Clean Water Act to dredge and fill
wetlands was not a taking), with Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1178-82 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (affirming that the denial of a development under the Clean Water Act constituted a taking).
241. See 535 U.S. 302, 334-35 (2002).
242. See id. at 341.
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the moratorium, the more closely it should be scrutinized,24 3 and the more
likely it will appear to restrict one class of owners for the benefit of a
different class.
Historic Preservation. Owners of historic landmarks and buildings
are often subject to regulations that do not apply to other owners. A
comparative takings doctrine suggests that whether a historic preservation
scheme requires compensation should depend on the number of owners
subject to preservation regulations, the degree to which regulated owners
are concentrated or dispersed among nonregulated owners, and whether
there are offsetting benefits provided by the legislation. The ultimate
question asked should be whether the regulations are reasonably expected
to benefit the class of regulated owners. Under this standard, the outcome
of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City is dubious. In that
case, New York City designated several hundred private buildings as
historic landmarks subject to special restrictions, which prevented at least
one owner from using valuable air space.244 The landmark owners were
relatively few and dispersed, and it seems implausible that they were made
better off as a group from the restrictions; rather, it was the nonregulated
public that seemed to benefit most from the legislation. However, even the
same set of restrictions as those imposed in Penn Central should not
require compensation if placed on owners in an established historic district
in a way that creates a reciprocity of advantage in those communities.
Unlike dispersed landmark owners, landowners within a historic district are
likely to be among the strongest supporters of the restrictions because they
have a vested interest in the historic character of the community.
3. Loretto, Dolan, and Beyond
Beyond land use restraints, a comparative takings theory serves to
clarify other areas of takings law, including physical invasions and
exactions. The Supreme Court's rules governing physical invasions and
exactions are well established, but the rules only make sense if we
understand the Takings Clause as an equality rule.
According to Loretto,245 government regulations that impose
permanent physical occupations of private property are per se takings. The
Loretto rule does not, on its face, ask whether a government action has
243. Indeed, as the Court suggested in Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, Inc., "It may well be true that
any moratorium that lasts for more than one year should be viewed with special skepticism." Id. at 341.
244. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115-18 (1978).
245. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-35 (1982).
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treated the plaintiff landowner differently from neighboring landowners.
Yet, like the deprivation-of-all-beneficial-use rule, the permanent physical
occupation rule serves to effectively identify one class of cases in which
landowners typically are treated unequally for the purpose of benefiting the
broader public. Rarely does a government physically occupy private land
in a sufficiently general and equal manner that it would meet the standards
of taxation; rather, when the government acts to occupy private land, as
when the government takes a public easement for a road, the quantity of
any given owner's land that it chooses to occupy is based on its usefulness
to the public.24 6 Because one owner's rights are diminished in a unique
way for the benefit a larger class, the Fifth Amendment requires
compensation.
Similarly, the Supreme Court established in Nollan and Dolan that
government may not require an owner to surrender a real property interest
in exchange for a regulatory approval, unless the property interest is both
causally connected and proportional to the adverse effects of the land
use.247 Otherwise, the owner is entitled to compensation for the taking.
The Nollan-Dolan rule correlates with a comparative takings doctrine.
When the government imposes a condition as part of a subdivision or
permit approval, and if the condition is imposed to remedy the specific
effects of the owner's actions (and assuming that other owners in like
circumstances would be held to the same condition), the owner has not
been singled out to bear a special burden. If a condition is imposed solely
for the purpose of acquiring a property interest that the public desires,
however, then it becomes a form of uneven taxation.
The rules established in Loretto, Nollan, and Dolan do not make sense
as absolute protections for individual property rights. They do not prevent
the government from acquiring property interests from owners, nor do they
protect an owner's financial position vis-A-vis the government. The
government can always diminish an owner's wealth through property
taxation, and it can then use the revenue to acquire the owner's real and
personal property through eminent domain.
What Loretto and
246. Of course, if the government chooses to redefine many owners' rights to exclude in a
uniform way, or to physically occupy an equivalent portion of land belonging to a broad class of owners
for the owners' combined benefit, there is no good reason to require compensation. The government
would be justified in taxing those same owners to pay for the modification of their rights, so why not
allow it to turn two steps into one? In the typical case, however, a permanent physical-occupation rule
fits well with a comparative takings doctrine.
247. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring rough proportionality
between an imposition and its benefits); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)
(requiring a causal relationship between the property exaction and regulatory approval).
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Nollan-Dolan do effectively accomplish is force the government, when it
wishes to acquire the wealth and property of citizens, to do so in an
evenhanded way. Rather than allow the government to acquire property
from individual citizens based on the usefulness of the property to the
public, which places the burden of government on a disproportionate few,
the Loretto and Nollan-Dolan rules force the government to spread its costs
on society in the form of general taxation. Like the Lucas rule, they are
effective proxies for an underlying rule of equality.
V. CONCLUSION
The regulatory takings doctrine continues to bewilder courts and
scholars. The root of the problem is this: We ignore the relationship among
owners and assume that the Takings Clause protects something absolute in
each owner, or at least represents a balance between the government's
regulatory interests and an owner's economic position. The regulatory
takings doctrine is not a shield or an insurance policy. It is a web. Under
the theory I have described, a regulation is not a taking if it is generally
applicable throughout an entire jurisdiction, or if it applies to a group of
owners who are specially benefited by the regulation. A regulation
imposed on a discrete class of owners solely for the benefit of a larger
class, however, is a taking of private property and requires compensation.
This theory is consistent with history and the law of special assessments,
and it explains at least a large portion of modern takings law.
As a comparative right, the Takings Clause is closely related to the
Equal Protection Clause. But unlike the doctrine of equal protection, the
role of the Takings Clause is not to invalidate illegitimate government
action. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination among
owners that is arbitrary and unjustified. The remedy is invalidation of the
government action. By contrast, the Takings Clause is designed to address
cases where government discrimination among property owners is justified
on the basis of the broader pubic interest, but nevertheless disserves the
interests of those who are singled out. The remedy is just compensation.

